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ABSTRACT
POLITICALLY DIVIDED:
a comparative analysis of German right-wing extremist voter support

Carolyn Morgan
April 07, 2010
Despite twenty years of political reunification Germany remains a politically,
socially, and economically divided country. This has fuelled inequalities, which are used
by extreme political parties to gamer votes from citizens who have become disappointed
with the effects of reunification. I aim to examine voter behavior in eastern and western
Germany in respect to extreme right-wing parties. Furthermore, I isolated specific
factors, such as unemployment and immigration, and test their impacts on latent support
for right-wing extremist parties in the two regions. Using Politbarometer 2005 data, I
employed logistic regressions to examine voter support for extreme right-wing parties.
The analysis shows a significant positive impact from dissatisfaction with democracy and
levels of conflicts with immigrants on support for extreme right-wing parties and
supports the claim that extreme right-wing parties have found more success in eastern
Germany by focusing on some the by-products of reunification, such as xenophobia and
dissatisfaction with democracy.
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CHAPTER I

RIGHT WING EXTREMISM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN GERMANY

Sixty-five years after the fall of the Third Reich and Nazism, the fear of a
resurgence remains. Despite attempted bans and other legal actions, extreme right-wing
political parties, which espouse what some claim to be Nazi-like rhetoric, remain a factor
in the political system and have continued to gain an increasing amount of media
coverage and public support in some regions. In some European countries, right-wing
extremist political parties often receive five to ten percent of the vote, but in Germany
they have failed to garner enough support to play a significant role in the federal
government. While extreme right-wing parties have existed in western Germany since
the 1950s, they are a relatively new phenomenon in eastern Germany - a by-product of
democratization. This research focuses on the differences in voting behavior between
eastern and western Germany, aiming to answer the questions: "what influences citizens
to support right-wing extremist parties?" and "how have the consequences of
reunification affected support for right-wing extremist parties in eastern Germany?"
Comparative research allows us to measure and compare the effect of several factors,
such as unemployment, anti-immigrant sentiment, and satisfaction with democracy, on
right-wing extremist support between the two regions.

Given the common political

structure, yet differing political cultures, Germany is a perfect environment for a
comparative study of what motivates voters to support right-wing extremist parties.
1

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Of interest, for historical and political reasons, is the alleged increased popularity
of right-wing extremist parties in Germany, particularly in eastern Germany. In this
comparative study the main questions are: are eastern Germans more likely to support
right-wing extremist groups than western Germans? And if so, why? To answer this
question, I analyze the difference in support for right-wing extremist parties between the
regions using two different theories on voter behavior, in addition to theories on ethnic
conflict: the theory of relative deprivation and exit, voice, and loyalty as my theoretical
framework. The theory of relative deprivation, introduced to political science by Ted
Gurr (1970), states that if a citizen's expectations are not met, dissatisfaction will ensue. 1
As dissatisfaction increases, the likelihood of revolt rises.

This is a key factor in

analyzing eastern German voting behavior, as many citizens have yet to experience the
positive consequences of reunification and have become disgruntled with the political
system (Gensing, 2009; Fuchs, 1999). With reunification now 20 years in the past, it is
plausible that relative deprivation explains right-wing extremist voter behavior.
Additionally, Albert Hirschman's "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty" (1970) lays out three
methods of voter behavior: exit the system, voice concern or dissatisfaction by voting for
an opposition party, or remain loyal to the system and create change from within.
Assuming that eastern Germans have specific, cynical, attitudes towards democratization

1 The

term "relative deprivation" was coined by Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues in
1949, but has since been used throughout the social sciences, being applied to history,
sociology, political science, psychology, and economics (Crosby, 1979: 104). Gurr
(1970) bases much of his work on Runciman's work, Relative Deprivation and Social
Justice: A Study ofAttitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth Century England (1966).
2

and the outcomes of reunification, it is likely that they have become dissatisfied with the
system and are using their votes as a protest against the current political situation.
These theories help to answer the main questions of this study: are eastern
Germans more likely to support a right-wing party? And if so, is their support a product
of their unfulfilled expectations resulting from reunification? It is expected that, with
reunification now 20 years in the past and little improvement in eastern Germany,
citizens are more likely to resent their conditions and choose to change the system
through protest voting. However, this also leads to the question of whether right-wing
support in eastern Germany is simply a manifestation of Hirschman's protest theory,
where citizens use their vote as a voice of discontent with the current democratic political
system. Additionally, since right-wing extremist parties are often highly xenophobic and
use immigration as a key point in their campaigns, we must also consider that support for
these parties is based more on anti-immigrant sentiment. Using ethnic conflict theory,
which states that citizens create in-groups and out-groups based on ethnicity and blame
out-groups for problems, we can expect that citizens who perceive a higher level of
conflict between Germans and immigrants will also be more likely to support a rightwing extremist party. This is relevant to eastern Germany because of the sudden influx
of immigrants into the region after reunification.

HYPOTHESES
The claim that right-wing extremist parties utilize the stable unemployment rates
to gain electoral support by exploiting relative deprivation and democratic dissatisfaction
and scapegoating immigrants are empirically tested using data from the 2005
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Politbarometer. The results show a definitive difference between the regions concerning
factors which motivate right-wing extremist support. Reasons for right-wing extremist
support vary; do citizens support these parties out of protest against the current political,
economic, or social conditions? Or, do they support these parties for ideological reasons?
In order to answer these questions, I developed four testable hypotheses addressing rightwing extremist support: HI) Voters in eastern Germany, when compared to western

Germans, are more likely to prefer a right-wing extremism party, establishes the main
framework of this comparative study in that it shows a difference in support between the
two regions. The second hypothesis, H2) Citizens who are dissatisfied with democracy

are more likely to support a right-wing extremist party compared to those who are
satisfied with democracy is based on the theories of relative deprivation and protest
voting, where citizens who are dissatisfied will resort to extraordinary means to voice
their dissatisfaction or change the system. In line with H2, the third hypothesis, H3)

Citizens in eastern Germany who are less satisfied with democracy, are more likely to
support a right-wing extremist party analyzes the level of satisfaction with democracy
within eastern Germany and its effect on right-wing extremist supp0!1.
As a result of reunification, eastern Germany has experienced abnormally high
unemployment rates, which also feeds dissatisfaction. Although not necessarily caused
by increased immigration, many right-wing extremist parties blame the high
unemployment rates on foreigners who are claimed to take jobs away from Germans. In
order to test if xenophobia facilitates right-wing extremist support, H4) The stronger the

perceived conflict with immigrants, the greater the likelihood that the voter will prefer a
right-wing extremist party is based on ethnic conflict theory, which claims that as

4

situations worsen, citizens will tend to blame ethnic mit-groups for the worsenmg
conditions. It is expected that, the more conflict one perceives, the more likely one is to
vote for a right-wing extremist party. Since economic conditions are dramatically worse
in eastern Germany, it is likely that eastern Germans are more likely to perceive a greater
conflict between immigrants and Germans, and therefore will be more likely to support a
right-wing extremist party.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Using a multivariate analysis, I found more support for right-wing extremist
parties m eastern Germany compared to western Germany, with xenophobia and

,
dissatisfaction with democracy explaining the regional differences in support for the
parties. From the analysis, it is believed that worsening economic conditions, which lead
to dissatisfaction, and an increased perceived conflict with immigrants work together to
promote support for right-wing extremist parties.

The analyses show that although

eastern Germans have had less contact with foreigners, because of the worsening
economic conditions since reunification and higher levels of dissatisfaction with
democracy, combined with an influx of immigrants into the region, eastern Germans have
a higher likelihood to support right-wing extremist parties. Despite the lower number of
immigrants in eastern Germany compared to western Germany, the perceived level of
conflict between Germans and immigrants is higher in eastern Germany, which leads to
an increase in support for right-wing extremist parties.

5

GERMANY AS AN ENVIRONMENT FOR A COMPARATIVE STUDY
The German reunification provided a unique and rare environment for a
comparative study of voter behavior and democratization. After 40 years of separation
the two countries united, combining two regions which experienced dramatically
different political situations.

However, significant differences continue to separate

eastern and western Germany and have created gross economic inequalities between the
two regions. In fact, some refer to eastern Germany as the equivalent of the Italy's
mezzogornio, a geographical region (southern Italy) that is fimincially subsidized by a

more prosperous region (northern Italy) (Boltho, Carlin, and Scaramozzino, 1997). The
inequalities between the two states, an unforeseen consequence of reunification, have led
to increased disappointment and overall dissatisfaction with reunification in some regions
of the country, particularly in eastern Germany. Increasing unemployment, diminishing
social welfare benefits, an increased cost of living, loss of industry, and an influx of
immigrants have been cited as reasons for increased dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the
unfulfilled expectations of reunification have fueled politics based on resentment in some
regions of eastern Germany, which often motivates citizens to support extremist parties.

STUDY OVERVIEW
This study is divided into four substantive sections, beginning with the German
reunification and the antecedents of inequality between the two regions and progressing
into an empirical comparative analysis of voter behavior and party preferences between
eastern and western Germany.

Chapter two provides an historical overview of the

political and economic situation in Germany shortly before and since reunification.
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These factors are highly relevant to analyzing right-wing voter behavior for the fact that a
majority of the campaign propaganda refers to the negative consequences of
reunification: massive unemployment and cultural change.

As mentioned, increased

levels of immigration, which are needed to compensate for the negative birth rate, are
also viewed by many as a source of the poor economic conditions.

Some perceive

immigrants as competition and often blame them for the negative repercussions of
reunification. Combined with unprecedented high unemployment levels, many extreme
right-wing parties have used the effects of reunification to create an environment of
hostility toward immigrants by portraying them not only as a burden on the social and
educational resources, but also by depicting immigrants as uneducated, antisocial
criminals who seek to undermine the dominant European culture (Fireside, 2002).
Although it was widely predicted that equality or social unity throughout
Germany would not immediately follow reunification, many have become disillusioned
and disgruntled with the outcomes, with some resorting to using their votes as means to
illustrate their dissatisfaction. Chapter two also establishes the two prominent theories
used in this study. Albert Hirschman's theory of voting (exit, voice, and loyalty) (1970),
and the theory of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) are used to theoretically explain the
possible motivations behind eastern German voter behavior.
Chapter three, a literature review of previous studies of right-wing extremism,
highlights the previous research in right-wing extremist voter behavior, which I use to set
up my analysis and establish the importance of the selected variables in the analysis of
right-wing extremism support.

Although some scholars discredit using resentment

towards foreigners as a primary independent variable (Kitschelt, 1995), others continue to
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use it as an important independent variable, mainly for the reason that it contributes to
overall dissatisfaction with the political situation (Art, 2007). Additionally, it remains
unclear whether socio-economic status alone can explain support for right-wing extremist
groups. Some claim that social group identification plays a more influential role in rightwing extremism (Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim, 2004). However, it has also been found
that perceived economic situation does play a role in right-wing extremist support.
Portraying immigrants as competition, right-wing extremist parties are capable of tapping
into resentment and dissatisfaction by appealing to the lower social strata, poorer
educated, and those who hold authoritarian tendencies (Lubbers and Sheepers, 2001;
Lipset, 1981; Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim, 2004).
In chapter four, I investigate the factors which influence support for right-wing
extremist parties. Beginning with descriptive statistics I find that right-wing extremist
groups find slightly more support in eastern Germany, and more importantly those who
are dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to prefer right-wing extremist parties.
Furthermore, eastern Germans are much more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy.
The descriptive statistics indicate that perceived personal economic situation and
perceived level of conflict between immigrants and Germans also influence latent support
for right-wing extremist groups. In addition, the threat of increased immigration and
social factors is found to significantly facilitate support for right-wing extremism, similar
to previous studies (Knigge, 1998).
In chapter five, I examine two popular explanations of latent support for rightwmg extremist parties: social and cultural changes (i.e. increased immigration), and
political developments (i.e. dissatisfaction with democracy and, in the case of Germany,
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reunification).

The findings suggest that, despite 20 years of official reunification,

eastern and western Germany remain politically divided, with eastern Germany more
vulnerable in respect to right-wing extremist political influences. The social, cultural and
political differences covered in chapter two, in addition to the continuing consequences
of reunification such as increasing immigration and unemployment rates, continue to be
points of contention. Higher levels of dissatisfaction with democratization in eastern
Germany, in combination with the influx of immigrants and poor economic situation
create fertile ground for extremist parties in eastern Germany. Additionally, if right-wing
parties continue to garner support, they can potentially begin to influence policy
decisions concerning immigration and further endanger democratization in eastern
Germany.
On a wider spectrum, the overall increase of support for right-wing extremist
groups in Europe can effectively block any attempt by candidate countries, such as
Turkey, from entering the European Union. As seen in Switzerland with the minaret ban,
if allowed right-wing extremist parties can ultimately affect public policy.

And

furthermore, with perfect timing, these parties can potentially change immigration
policies. What is currently portrayed as a minority political party can have dramatic
effects on national, and in some cases, international politics.

For this reason, it is

important to understand what issues and situations motivate voters to support such
parties; and for such a comparison, Germany proves to be a fitting example.

9

CHAPTER II

GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND THE FOUNDATION OF INEQUALITIES

Using populist rhetoric to attract the underprivileged and lower social classes,
right-wing extremist groups often focus on social and economic inequalities, as well as
increased immigration, to gain electoral support.

For this reason, it is essential to

establish the source of inequalities that fuel resentment in eastern Germany, which the
right-wing extremist groups exploit. This chapter is purposefully divided into three main
sections, with section 1 providing a brief explanation of the reunification preceding, and
section 2 defining the theoretical framework. The final section, an analysis of the effects
of reunification, is used to establish the importance of the inequalities that divide
Germany, and to emphasize the relevance of Hirschman's and Gurr's theories in this
study. These concepts, in conjunction with the effects of reunification, will be used to
analyzing the motivation behind supporting right-wing extremist parties.
Undoubtedly, both eastern and western Germans have been profoundly affected
by reunification, both positively and negatively. Understanding the current situation in
the Federal Republic and differences in voter behaviors requires an understanding of the
reunification and its political and societal effects.

Although some reunification

processes, such as rebuilding the eastern German infrastructure, are still underway, most
. of the processes were short-sighted and led to disastrous consequences. These negative
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consequences, such as increased unemployment and an ever shrinking social welfare
system, have led some to support extremist political parties.

PRE-UNIFICATION RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FRG AND GDR

In 1969, eight years after the construction of the Berlin Wall, the GDR and FRG
began to pursue a cooperative relationship with one another (Jones, 1994: 38).
Throughout the next two decades, relations between East and West Germany continued
to improve. The joint efforts of both East and West Germany helped to maintain a sense
of German national identity, which acted as the catalyst for reunification. However,
despite a unifying sense of national identity, during 40 years of separation the two
countries developed distinctly different political and social norms through political
socialization, which continues to influence the different voting patterns between the two
regIOns.
Until mid-1989 the GDR seemed to resist the temptation to institute democratic
reforms (Kropp, 2000: 11). For this reason much of the world was surprised by the
reunification movements in April 1989. Four months after Honecker's statement that the
Berlin Wall would still be standing in 2069, East Germans began to flee and by August
1989, thousands of East German citizens had escaped to the West, while hundreds more
sought asylum and political protection in West German embassies in Warsaw, Budapest,
and Prague (Quint, 1997: 15-17; Fulbrook, 2009: 271).
An estimated 57,000 East Germans "voted with their feet" and took advantage of
the neighboring countries' reluctance to oblige the demands of the GDR to prohibit its
citizens from traveling to the West (Thackeray, 2004: 190). Migration rates, shown in
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Table 2.1, remained fairly steady between 1967 until 1984, with no more than 20,000
citizens leaving. After 1985, the number of citizens fleeing increased each year (except
in 1987), and sky-rocketed in 1989 to 343,854 migrants. However, not all East Germans
were eager to leave their homes. Many stayed behind, using their loyalty to the GDR to
push for reforms and civil rights, including the right to freely travel (Roberts, 2000: 24).
Table 2.1 Migrants from the GDR, 1962-1989
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

Total Migrants

21,365
42,632
41,876
29,552
24,131
19,573
16,036
16,975

Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

Total Migrants
17,519
17,408
17,164
15,189
13,252
16,285
15,168
12,078
12,117
12,515

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Total Migrants
12,763
15,433
13,208
11,343
40,974
24,912
26,178
18,958
37,657
343,854

Source: Hirschman, Albert o. 1993. "Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German
Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History." World Politics 45(2): 173-202
(who used data from Thomas Ammer, "Stichwort: Flucht aus der DDR," DeutschlandArchiv 22 (November 1989), 1207; and Harmut Wendt, "Die deutsch-deutschen
Wanderungen," Deutschland-Archiv 24 (April 1991), 390).

Lacking support from its neighbors and facing imminent economic sanctions from
the FRG and other western states, the GDR began its trek towards reform, beginning with
instituting the right to travel to the West, announced on November 9, 1989 (Roberts,
2000: 25; Kropp, 2000: 15; Fulbrook, 2009: 275).

This announcement spurred the

opening of the Berlin Wall - a seminal moment in German politics often used as the
symbol of reunification. However, both the GDR and the FRG were unprepared for full
reunification. Consequently, after the opening of the border, an estimated 1 million East
Germans moved to the FRG, which increased the economic devastation in the GDR,
12

strained the FRG's social welfare system, and further strengthened the citizens'
movement toward reunification (Fulbrook, 2009: 280). Although GDR citizens held high
expectations for the reunification, the situation in the former GDR remains disturbed by
the rapid reunification process, which feeds dissatisfaction among eastern Germans. This
dissatisfaction and its sources have intensified the support for extreme right-wing
political parties, such as the Republikaner (REP), Nationaldemokratische Partei

Deutschlands (NPD),

and the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), that have exploited the

developing resentment against immigrants and foreigners (including East Germans) in
order to gain electoral support (Fulbrook, 2009: 280).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

With the precursors of reunification now established, the next section outlines the
two theories behind motivation for right-wing extremist support, Gurr's theory of relative
deprivation and Hirschman's theory of exit, voice and loyalty.

After the theoretical

framework, the political and social differences between eastern and western Germany
since reunification are discussed, using these theories to establish the relevance of
investigating for support right-wing extremist parties in eastern Germany. The political
and social differences, and resulting inequalities, provide examples for both theories and
how extreme right-wing parties used the inequalities to gain electoral support. Using
concepts of voting motivation from Hirschman and Gurr, the following section seeks to
explain the theories behind right-wing extremist voter motivation.

13

EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: METHODS
DISCONTENT WITHIN A POLITICAL SYSTEM

OF

EXPRESSING

In 1970, Albert Hirschman described three options, referred to as exit, voice, and
loyalty, for citizens to communicate to leaders their perceptions of failings within the
system (Hirschman, 1970). The "exit" concept derives from voter frustration that has
reached a level that leaves the voter so disgruntled with the existing system they chose
not to participate (or in the case of the GDR, leave the country). Since democratization,
eastern Germans now have the option to participate in government or voice their
dissatisfaction through voting. Hirschman's second option, voice, is defined as " any
attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs,
whether through individual or collective petition [ ... ] or through various types of
protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion" (Hirschman, 1970:
30).

Voice was clearly demonstrated prior to reunification, with massive protests

beginning in 1989, directed at affecting change within the GDR system. Furthermore, it
remains an important factor in analyzing the current political situation. Similar to Gurr's
theory of relative deprivation, once a voter reaches a certain point of dissatisfaction, the
rational option is to protest the system through various means.
The final concept, loyalty, addresses a citizen's allegiance to a party or political
system. Although thousands of people either escaped the GDR or participated in the
protests, many channeled their concerns by remaining loyal to the GDR. According to
Hirschman, "loyalty, far from being irrational, can serve the socially useful propose of
preventing deterioration from becoming cumulative" (1970: 79). Maintaining loyalty to
the party or political system allows the citizen to work within the established framework
of the system to generate change.
14

-~------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~------

- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -

-------~~~~~~-

The interplay of these three options can be found throughout reunification, and
their combination can be attributed to the successful push for reunification.

More

importantly, protest voting can be used to explain support for opposition parties, such as
right-wing extremist groups. However, combining the theory of exit, voice, and loyalty,
which explains behavior of voters, with the theory of relative deprivation can provide
more theoretical insight, and highlight why the expectations preceding unification, are
highly relevant to understanding the motivations of right-wing extremist support and
eastern German voting behavior.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

Relative deprivation, introduced to political science by Ted GUIT, is derived from
Runciman's study on social inequalities and Davies's "J-Curve" hypothesis which states
that "political rebellion is most likely to occur when expected and actual need satisfaction
rise for a period of time followed by a sudden decline in actual need satisfaction,
resulting in the experience of a substantial discrepancy between expected and actual
satisfaction of needs" (Muller and Jukam, 1983: 161).
According to GUIT, the relative deprivation of needs and satisfaction "identifies
common but not sufficient conditions for unrest" (Handelman, 2003: 208-209). The
actual deprivation is not as important as the perceived discrepancy between individuals'
expectations and what they attain; however, the nearer one is to achieving their goals, the
greater their frustration will be if they fail to reach those goals (Handelman, 2003: 209;
GUIT, 1970). In the case of eastern Germany, citizens had protested and moved for
reforms, and once reunification plans were within reach, their expectations increased and
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were buttressed by Chancellor Kohl's enthusiasm and encouragement.

Their

expectations were founded on promises by political leaders, such as Kohl's repeated
assurance that he would bring the former GDR citizens to the same socio-economic level
as their western counterparts by 1994, without increasing taxes (O'Brien, 1997: 452).
Both theories outlined here are important to understanding the underlying
inequalities between eastern and western Germany and how they play into voter
behavior. Both theories of exit, voice, and loyalty and relative deprivation are relevant to
discussing the effects of reunification and will be used throughout the remainder of this
chapter to show how the effects of reunification can influence support for right-wing
extremist parties.

REUNIFICATION POLICIES
Many of the negative consequences of reunification are related to the economic
restructuring of the GDR and it impacts on the industries, employment opportunities, as
well as the overall economic structure. However, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
optimistically assured the people that, within five years, East Germans would enjoy a
similar standard of living compared to their western counterparts, explaining that eastern
Germany would become a "flourishing landscape" and proclaiming that "no one [in East
Germany] will be worse off than before - and many will be better off [after
reunification]" (Abshire, 2004: 192; Quint, 1997: 57; Hefeker and Wunner, 2003: 103).
Unfortunately, many of the "challenges were unforeseen or ignored by politicians, the
media, and many political scientists" (Yoder, 2000: 115).
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These promises remain unfulfilled, thereby fueling sentiments of disappointment
and resentment.

This relative deprivation, stemming from unfilled promises and

expectations, encourages voters to protest against the current system, and express their
disappointment with the reunification processes by supporting right-wing extremist
parties.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

One approach to creating the "flourishing landscape" was to accelerate the East
German economy, thereby minimizing the period of expected economic inequality
between the two regions.

In contrast to its eastern neighbors, the GDR had "the

extraordinary advantage of being able to draw on economic resources from the formerly
West German and now all-German public budgets and social security funds"
(Wiesenthal, 2003: 40). Despite shock therapy's relative success within other eastern
bloc countries, the added stress of reunification lead to different effects in the former
GDR.

Whereas the other eastern bloc countries could opt to retain their currency,

German reunification demanded a controversial monetary unification process in which
the West German Mark replaced the East German Mark virtually overnight (Abshire,
2004: 194; Quint, 1997: 59, Wiesenthal, 2003: 40).
The reevaluation resulted in a sudden appreciation of the GDR Mark by
approximately 400 percent, which affected the competitiveness of East German goods
and services. By some accounts, it tripled the cost of East German goods on the world
market, increased the cost of labor within East German, and allowed a massive influx of
western manufacturers' goods to flood the East German markets, thereby severely
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damaging the already struggling East German industries that could not compete with the
western goods (Quint, 1997: 59, Abshire, 2004: 192; Fulbrook, 2009: 285-286).
Furthermore, increased imports and wage equalization, facilitated by huge income
transfers from the FRG, resulted in a collapse of the manufacturing industry in the former
GDR, as well as a sudden rise in unemployment (Wiesenthal, 2003: 37; Abshire, 2004:
193).2 In addition, the currency union, which established the rate of currency exchange
between the GDR and FRG, prohibited devaluing the currency as a method to increase
eastern competition; so the eastern German firms could not afford rapidly increasing
wages, which often exceeded productivity, resulting in higher unemployment rates
(Wiesenthal, 2003: 41; Pohl, 1991: 51).
The economic consequences of reunification far exceeded expectations. Between
1989 and 1991 the gross domestic product (GDP) of eastern Germany declined by 40
percent, industrial production declined by 70 percent, and unemployment increased by 40
percent (O'Brien, 1997: 457). In 1994, eastern Germany's GDP equaled 7.9 percent of
the total German GDP, while the region contributed to only two percent of the country's
total exports (O'Brien, 1997: 457). These figures are directly related to the economic
reunification policies.

Although eastern Germany would have by no estimates been

economically equal to western Germany after the democratic transition, the citizens
expected that reunification would provide a more effective transition. The consequences
not only affected employment rates but also public opinion, which influences how people

Abshire estimates that 80 percent of the manufacturing jobs were lost as a result of wage
equalization (2004: 193).
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vote. The differences in expectations and experience since reunification contribute also
to the political distinctiveness between eastern and western Gennany.

UNEMPLOYMENT

Another factor that influences both eastern Gennan and right-wing extremist voter
behavior is unemployment. While unemployment during the GDR was a concept rarely
experienced, it now plagues the new five Gennan states.

After reunification,

unemployment grew twice as fast in eastern Gennany compared to western Gennany
(Wiesenthal, 2003: 42). By the end of 1992 four million (of the previous nine million)
jobs were lost through privatization efforts and despite the massive amount of funding
and support from western Gennan/, the region is still economically inferior when
compared to its western counterpart (Quint, 1997: 148-149; Pohl, 1991: 36-41).
Although some have stated that the "severity of the depression in East Gennany
[was] without parallel in modern economic history" and "not even the Great Depression
of 1928-1933 was as bad," there has been marked progress in the development of eastern
Gennany (Quint, 1997: 56).

While in 1994 the actual rate of production in eastern

Gennany was estimated at 30 percent (Abshire, 2004: 192), Grosser (2000: 33-34)
reported an increase of 30 percent in productivity, an increase in nominal net incomes
from 55 percent in 1995 to 86 percent in 2000, and an increase in enterprise capital stock
from 25 percent in 1991 to 75 percent in 2000 - all positive indicators for the still
developing economy. However, despite these improvements, unemployment continues to

Net transfers of funding in 2002 were estimated between 100-150 billion Gennan
Marks, roughly four to six percent of western Gennany's GDP (Backer and Klammer,
2002).
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plague the region, hovering between 15 and 20 percent in some eastern regions, and has
become a political issue that the right-wing extremist groups exploit.

RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM: VOTER BEHAVIOR AND SOCIO-POLITICAL
FACTORS

Until now, I have explained the economIC effects of reunification, briefly
touching on the psychological effects that reunification has had on the German people,
who once chanted that they were "ein Volk" and now refer to each other as "Wessies"
and "Ossies."

Additionally, there has been little discussion of political culture,

socialization, or influencing factors of voter behavior.
The feelings of inequality and resentment that right-wing extremist parties exploit
stem directly from the quick transition to democracy and reunification. Whereas the FRG
had 40 years experience with democracy, the GDR had none - with the exception of the
failed Weimar Republic. Furthermore, while other eastern bloc countries were able to
stipulate the conditions of their democratic transition, the GDR and its citizens had little
to no say in their transition. The method of democratic transition, which was dictated by
the FRG, plays an important role in promoting feelings of helplessness, resentment, and
relative deprivation throughout eastern Germany.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Samuel

Huntington

described

three

types

of

democratic

transitions:

transformation, which is defined by elites bringing about democracy. Transplacement,
which is described as democratization that has "resulted largely from joint action by
government or opposition groups," and replacement, which occurs when opposition
20
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groups take the charge of "bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regIme
collapsed or was overthrown" (Huntington, 1991: 114).

While Kim and Robertson

(2002: 9) assert that replacement democracy best describes the GDR's democratic
transition, "the problem with assuming the German reunification was a replacement
transition is that it hides the collective goals of opposition groups" who used protests to
promote broad-based reforms.
The reforms, however, did not influence the legal framework of the reunification
process. Although the GDR "preferred a modernized democratic socialist East Germany
in an economic and political confederation with West Germany," the chosen method of
reunification was found in Article 23 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law, German
Constitution) (Wiesenthal, 2003: 39). This stated that the Grundgesetz was applicable in
the 11 western German states, and "in other parts of Germany, it is to be set into force
after their entry" into a unified Germany (author's translation). This meant that all of the
necessary adjustments and changes required for merger were to be made by the GDR
rather than the FRG (Roberts, 2000: 31) and left little opportunity for eastern Germans to
dictate the terms of reunification or the structure of their future democratic institutions.
The assumption was that with the take-over approach and institutional replication,
political and cultural democratic behavior would develop (Yoder, 2000: 118). However,
these assumptions failed to acknowledge the time required for "demographic integrations,
which involves people and their relationship to the norms and institutions of democracy"
(Yoder, 2000: 118). While it is understood that institutions can help to develop and
promote democratic behaviors, the transition from an authoritarian regime to a
democracy (in the minds of the citizens) is not instantaneous. Consequently, "attempts to
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do so are likely to meet with resistance and may have unintended consequences" such as
dissatisfaction with the progress of the democratic transition (or lack thereof),
resentment, protest, or nostalgia for the previous political system (Yoder, 2000: 118).
"Democracy cannot ... be put on like a coat, rather it must take root in the minds and
hearts ... Democracy can only prevail ... if it begins in the souls of men." (Hans-loachim
Maaz, cited in O'Brien, 1997: 464.)
Recovering from the 40 year absence of democracy in the GDR and accepting
democratic norms requires time.

Patterns of democratization are transformed slowly

through generations, learned through political socialization, and most importantly are
promoted by positive experiences with "institutions, procedures, and representative of the
new system" (Fulbrook, 2009: 259; Yoder, 2000, 133). However, democratic political
socialization is also strengthened by economic progress.

So long as the economic

conditions in eastern German remain stagnant, eastern Germans will remain dissatisfied
with the democratic transition and thereby vulnerable to the appeals of right-wing
extremist parties. Additionally, the psychological division of Germany further hinders
the internalization of democratic tendencies, which can be seen in the measurement of
satisfaction with democracy across the two regions in Table 2.2 below. Because of the
FRG's dominance during reunification, and the relative success of western Germany,
many eastern Germans blame the current economic and political problems on western
German dominance during reunification and therefore resort to supporting extremist
parties.
Using Politbarometer data from 2005, we see a distinct difference in levels of
satisfaction with democracy between eastern and western Germany. Whereas democratic
satisfaction is 86 percent in western Germany, only 74.4 percent of eastern Germans are
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satisfied, leaving over a quarter of the eastern German population dissatisfied with
democracy. Given the ideological differences among adults who experience political
socialization in the GDR and FRG, it is of no surprise that the two regions have different
expectations of democracy (Fuchs, 1999). Furthermore, it is understandable that the
unfulfilled expectations of the democratic transition have fueled politics based on
resentment in some regions of eastern Germany, which often motivates citizens to
support extremist parties.
Table 2.2 Region and Satisfaction with Democracy
East
West
Percent Satisfied
86.0
74.4
Percent Dissatisfied
14.0
25.6
Total Percent
100.0
100.0
Total Count
4,456
4,247
Chi-Square Tests, Value: 184.293, df: 1, Asymp. Sig (2-sided): 0.000
Number of Valid Cases: 8,703

Total
80.4
19.6
100.0
8,703

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS
In order to understand the level of democratic dissatisfaction, we must remember
that Chancellor Kohl promised the eastern German people that within a short period of
time, they would enjoy the same standard of living as their western counterparts.
Whereas western German democracy had 40 years experience prior to reunification and
survived several economic shows, student radicalism and a massive influx of immigrants
(Klingemann and Hofferbert, 1994), eastern Germany democracy is still young and its
citizens are still undergoing the process of internalizing democratic. sentiments.

As

Putnam (1993: 60), in his analysis of democracy in Italy, explained: "popular legitimacy
of new institutions, even successful ones, grows only gradually."
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The reasons for democratic dissatisfaction are many. However, as Fuchs (1999)
points out, a great deal of dissatisfaction rises from expectations of the system and the
understanding of what democracy should entail. A fundamental assumption, that eastern
Germans expected a different model of democracy compared to what they received is one
reason why eastern Germans have a more skeptical outlook towards the democratic
governing institutions in unified Germany (Fuchs, 1999: 124).

Lepsius (1995: 24)

described the GDR democracy as a "socialist welfare state with an authority-related,
hierarchical decision-making structure," in which the state pursued collective interests
grounded in egalitarian principles of equality.
With this, we can assume that through political socialization many citizens in the
former GDR favor a socialist model of democracy, which is substantially different from
the liberal model of democracy that was imposed after reunification (Fuchs, 1999: 135136). However, the guarantee of social rights (which accompany socialist democracy),
such as job security and social welfare programs, largely depends on economic
development.

With the political agenda since reunification focusing on cutting back

social welfare programs, eastern Germans have been "hardly able to judge the
performance of democracy positively" (Fuchs, 1999: 140). As time has passed, eastern
Germans have had to adjust their expectations as it becomes apparent that democracy in a
united Germany will not adjust to their socialist-democratic views. This also leads to
increased feelings of relative deprivation, in that their expectations have not been met.
Ingelhart and Welzel (2005: 120) state that "if support for democracy is primarily
based on unrealistically high policy expectations rather than an intrinsically high
evaluation of free choice, it may bring rising frustration," which has been the case in
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many new democracies, including eastern Germany (Schroeder, 2007: 105). Following
reunification, rather than create "flourishing landscapes," the opposite occurred, with
some regions of eastern Germany still experiencing unemployment rates above 20
percent. Opp (2000:29), in his study of grievances and political protest in Leipzig, found
that the resource deficit (in this case employment) had a strong indirect positive effect on
discontent, which in tum leads to a strong increase of general discontent.
More important to consider is the length of time that democracy has been
implemented in eastern Germany. Although many theorists have cautioned that extremist
political parties pose serious threats to democracy, more important to note is that they
also attribute the appearance of extremist parties to a weak party system (Satori, 1976;
Duverger, 1954). Democracy in eastern Germany is relatively young, and the party
system, although imported from western Germany, still requires more time and citizen
support. Even though it remains unclear whether the presence of extremist parties, when
strong, is a signal of citizen discontent (Powell, 1986), the previous analysis indicates that
there is a connection between dissatisfaction with democracy and region. And, based on
the historical analysis, we see that after reunification satisfaction with democracy has
been consistently lower in eastern Germany.
Additionally, after reunification an eastern German dependency on western
Germany developed, a result of the rebuilding process in which many westerners, who
were "practiced in taking decisions, in making things work and for assessing the risks of
the market, and who had the skills and funds to take charge," began to dictate the
reunification proceedings (Stem, 1993: 111). Rather than take control of the situation
and reassert their role in the reunification process, Stem claims that many East Germans
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began to express their dissatisfaction in "tenns of self-pity and resentment" (1993: 111),
which some have claimed has added to the popularity of extremist groups.
Although in a comparative context, the situation in eastern Gennany has
dramatically improved since 1989 and reunification has aided East Gennany in its
improvement, in comparison to Poland and the Czech Republic, it remains far behind its
western counterpart. Despite the monetary transfers from West Gennany, East Gennany
still has a lower GDP than its neighbor Poland (Hefeker and Wunner, 2003; Wiesenthal,
2003: 43), which also heightens relative deprivation in another fashion.

As eastern

Gennans see neighboring countries successfully transition to democracy, they begin to
resent their current situation and envy their neighbors' successes, and become further
dissatisfied with democracy and the outcomes of reunification.
dissatisfaction increases, so does right-wing extremist support.

Furthennore, as

As dissatisfaction in

eastern Gennany is higher, there is more support for the claim that eastern Gennans are
more likely to support right-wing parties.

THE AFTERMATH OF REUNIFICATION

The rallying cries of "wir sind ein Yolk" now remain a memory of an optimistic
past; on a psychological level, the Gennan people are now more divided than before
reunification. Living standards and wages are lower in eastern Gennany; unemployment
is, in some areas, three times higher than in western Gennany. Ever increasing economic
inequalities feed disappointment and lead to relative deprivation and self-pity in eastern
Gennany, while decreasing social welfare programs and the continuing cost of
reunification lead to anger and resentment in western Gennany (Stem, 1993: 121).
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Dissatisfaction with the outcomes of reunification is not isolated to eastern
Germany. The federalist arrangement provides a "central element that resource flows
from the national government to states and wealthier to poorer states to equalize
revenues" (Abshire, 2004: 194). The transfers from 1991 equaled 75 billion DM and
have steadily increased to an annual average between 135 to 139 billion DM (Abshire,
2004: 195). 4 The sheer enormity of the transfers, in addition to the cuts in social services
which were necessary to maintain the transfers, have led many to question (and fear) the
long-term effects of reunification and invoke the notion of the former GDR becoming a
German mezzogornio, "which refers to the relatively impoverished region in southern
Italy that suffers from chronic joblessness and is sustained, seemingly permanently,
through payments from much more prosperous northern Italy" (Abshire, 2004: 195).
Although the decrease in social welfare programs is a recurring theme for right-wing
extremist parties, rarely do they point to the monetary transfers as the source of the cuts.
Rather, they prefer to use an increased immigrant population as the scapegoat, carefully
avoiding blaming eastern Germans.

GUEST WORKERS IN THE FRG AND GDR: "Eliminate Unemployment!
Stop Immigration!" (Betz, 1994: 416)

Another unforeseen consequence of reunification was the increased levels of
xenophobia and anti-immigrant violence in eastern Germany. It is not surprising, given
historical context, that scholars have found more xenophobic tendencies within eastern
Germany (Schroeder, 2007). However, both the FRG and the GDR implemented guest

Other estimates (Backer and Klammer, 2002) claim that the net transfers of funding
neared 100-150 billion DM, roughly four to six percent of western Germany's GDP.
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worker policies, consequently introducing immigrants to the German society, although
the two countries differed dramatically in their programs. In 1955, the FRG began to
recruit guest workers from Italy to help stoke the post-war economy and alleviate the
labor shortages and later expanded its contracts to Greece (1960), Spain (1960), Turkey
(1961), Portugal (1964), and Yugoslavia (1968) (Kahanec and Tosun, 2009;
Triadafilopoulos and Schonwalder, 2006: 8). The FRG did not expect the immigrants to
alter German society, and used a short-term labor market policy to respond to economic
demands, thereby failing to consider the long-term social and demographic consequences
of inviting a total of over two million guest workers 5 into the country (Kuechler, 1994:
78-79; Kahanec and Tosun, 2009; Fireside, 2002: 474; Yurdokul and Bodemann,
2006:50; Kil and Silver, 2006: 97; Triadafilopoulos and Schonwalder, 2006: 2, 10).
Much like the FRG, the GDR used guest workers to stimulate its economic
success, although it was much more restricted and lucrative. Unlike the guest workers in
the FRG, there was never any intention of integrating the guest workers in the GDR into
the host society; the guest workers were often subjected to curfews, travel restrictions,
and confined to housing segregated from the German population (Oppenheimer, 2004:
167; Kil and Silver, 2006; Fireside, 2004).

Given the relatively low number of

immigrants in the GDR, when the immigrants did venture into the German society "they
were subjected to racist behavior of a petty, repressed population" (Oppenheimer, 2004:
168).

Despite the government's assertion that no xenophobia existed, Oppenheimer

Although over 300,000 guest workers returned to their home countries during the
recession of the late 1960s, Triadafilopoulos and Schonwalder (2006) cite the number of
foreign workers in the FRG to be near two million in the autumn of 1970 (10). Kuechler
(1994: 48-49) estimates this number to be closer to 2.6 million.
5
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(2004: 168-169) cites that during the late 1970s reports of xenophobic aggression became
more frequent.

Fo1,lowing reunification, the combination of suddenly increased

unemployment and the dramatic increase of immigrants proved a dangerous mixture in
eastern Germany, when neo-Nazi inspired violence in the eastern German cities of
Hoyerswerda and Rostock (in 1991) captured the world's attention. In addressing the
sudden increase in xenophobic violence, a government official postulated that "the
distribution of refugees to the East went too fast [ ... ] The population was unprepared for
the refugees" (Braunthal, 2009: 100).
Despite the fears that immigrants take jobs away from German citizens, foreign
workers are needed to maintain the current economic trends. Fireside (2002:475) states
that, due to the negative birth rates, by 2050 the general population (including those not
able to work) will decrease from approximately 82 million to 62 million, and the
workforce will shrink from a current 41 million to 26 million, thereby requiring an annual
influx of 250,000 immigrants to maintain the economy. Schmid-Droner (2006) agrees
with Fireside, however, estimating that Germany will require a positive migration
balance of 300,000 immigrants per year. However, this influx will not cure the effects of
a decreasing population and will result in a "decline in economic growth by one percent
each year due to a decreasing workforce" (Schmid-Droner, 2006: 191-192).
Nonetheless, right-wing extremist groups continue to attribute the high levels of
immigrants to the economic downfall of eastern Germany.

By exploiting fears of

financial and economic instability extreme right-wing groups are able to use foreigners as
scapegoats, portraying foreigners as a threat to citizens' incomes and financial wellbeing.
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CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The goal of this chapter was to build theories on voter preference that are
applicable to eastern Germany and right-wing extremist groups. Since 1990, East
Germans have had to adjust to a hasty transition to democracy. The social divisions and
inequalities discussed in this chapter render Germany an ideal environment in which to
examine what influences voter behavior and what effects unemployment, increased
immigration, age, and satisfaction with democracy have on support for right-wing
extremist parties. With the brief historical overview of the German reunification now
presented, chapter three examines the previous literature and studies on right-wing
extremism, focusing on three main factors: unemployment, immigration, and satisfaction
with democracy. As all three of these factors are, in eastern Germany, a direct result of
reunification, it is important to establish how these three affect the public psyche and
relates to relative deprivation and exit, voice, and loyalty. Following the literature review
of previous right-wing extremist voter behavior studies, the analysis shows that many of
these consequences from reunification do in fact affect support for right-wing extremist
parties in eastern Germany more so than in western Germany.
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CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW: RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST SUPPORT
IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

In the past two decades, the questions of why extreme right-wing parties have
gained popularity in some European countries have attracted increasing amounts of
attention from scholars. For historical reasons, right-wing extremist groups, particularly
in Germany, have continuously received scrutiny since the end of World War II. Many
propose that electoral support for extremist right-wing parties is indicative of "the
public's lacking commitment to democratic values and principles," which is also based
on dissatisfaction with the democratic system (Knigge, 1998: 249, c.f. Almond and
Verba, 1965; Lipset and Raab, 1978; Dahl, 1989).
This has been the case in eastern Germany since reunification, with an evergrowing number of right-wing extremist politicians exploiting discontent in order to gain
positions in local and regional governments. The goal of chapter three is to examine the
conditions under which right-wing extremist gain support in Germany and the factors
which differentiate voter behavior in the two regions in relation to right-wing extremist
parties.
The following literature review reflects the three main components of right-wing
extremist support and is purposefully divided into three substantive sections:
unemployment, immigration, and political dissatisfaction, to represent the three factors
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most scholars attribute to support for right-wing extremist groups. Within the literature,
where appropriate, a brief discussion of how these factors affect eastern and western
Germany will be included. Following the literature review, after the methodological
section, several hypotheses will be tested using data from the 2005 Politbarometer, and
the findings will be analyzed using theoretical and historical explanations found in
previous studies.

OVERVIEW OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

Although the shock of reunification is now 20 years in the past, eastern Germans
still face its repercussions daily. These problems, namely massive unemployment and
numerous social program cutbacks, often influence the dissatisfaction with democracy
that is found in the region and influences choices by voters. Many scholars indicate that
unemployment, an increase in immigration, and dissatisfaction with democracy often
facilitate support for right-wing extremist parties.

But, most scholarship on extreme

right-wing support concentrates on the electoral appeal of these parties in cross-national
comparative contexts, frequently localized in Europe.

These studies often lead to

conflicting conclusions, with unemployment remaining a controversial factor as a
potential indicator of right-wing extremist support. Lubbers and his colleagues (2002),
while maintaining that "economic malaise and competition between its majority group
and immigrants can be considered to be relevant in explaining differences between rightwing extremism in any particular country," found that level of unemployment is not
significant in predicting right-wing extremist motivation and "is even negatively related
to the differences in the level of extreme right-wing voting" (346; 364).
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Knigge (1998) concurs, finding that a declining national economy, often indicated
by unemployment negatively affects the electoral appeal of right-wing extremist parties.
In contrast, Lubbers and his colleagues found that unemployment levels do not influence
right-wing extremism, which could help to explain why some richer regions within
countries, such as northern Italy, have a higher level of support for right-wing parties
(2002: 371). However, not all scholars have dismissed the influence of unemployment as
a condition for right-wing extremist.

Golder (2003) proposes that "the effects of

unemployment are conditional: only when immigrants exceed a particular share of
national population does unemployment spur support for the (populist) extreme right"
(Kessler and Freeman, 2005:262). Unfortunately, Golder does not establish the breaking
point.

Despite these findings, Art maintains that right-wing extremist parties are

primarily

an

eastern

phenomenon,

feeding

off of discontentment,

increased

unemployment rates and dissatisfaction with democratic institutions (2007: 346).
These studies highlight the contexts and propose many hypotheses concerning
economic conditions, immigration levels, democratic satisfaction, and political
institutional structures that influence right-wing voter behavior, by relying on individual
characteristics found in electoral studies. These studies also show levels of support for
right-wing parties vary from region to region. As Lubbers and Sheepers (2002) and
Kessler and Freeman (2005) suggest, it is important to examine both the national and
individual characteristics which facilitate support for right-wing extremist groups.
While previous studies utilized cross-time and cross-national analyses, I employ a
micro-perspective analysis of right-wing voting in Germany and avoid such problems as
survey comparability and institutional variation found in previous studies. I concentrate
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on the 2005 Bundestag (federal parliament) elections to provide a snapshot of voter
behavior in Germany. Although parsimonious by some standards, this approach will
provide a detailed explanation of the factors that influence eastern German voter behavior
in relation to right-wing extremist parties. While some argue that providing a snapshot of
electoral support neglects the impact of social and economical changes, and therefore
does not reflect fluctuations in support for right-wing extremist groups, it does provide
valuable insight to the factors that promote such support (Jackman and Volpert, 1996;
Arzheimer, 2009).

LITERA TURE REVIEW
UNEMPLOYMENT: "Gebt den Leuten Arbeit, dann ist alles in Ordnung
(Give the people jobs, then everything is fine)." (Gensing, 2009: 65)
While many studies have found no, and in some cases negative, correlations
between right-wing extremist support and unemployment, Falk and Zweimuller (2005)
show a positive relationship between unemployment and right-wing crime. Although
right-wing crime differs from support for right-wing extremist groups, their findings still
emphasize the importance of including unemployment in the analysis of right-wing
extremist support. They propose relative deprivation as a possible explanation for this,
stating that the threat of unemployment leads to feelings of a loss in status and, therefore,
a feeling of deprivation. Deprivation then promotes preferences for authoritarianism, the
use of foreigners as scapegoats, and violent predispositions (Falk and Zweimuller, 2005:
2, c.f. Lipset, 1964; Falter, 1994). Using unpublished data from the Bundeskriminalamt
(Federal Criminal Police Office), Falk and Zweimuller discovered a significant positive
relation between state level of unemployment and the prevalence of right-wing crimes.
34
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Furthennore, they found little difference between the significance of impact between
eastern and western Gennany - meaning that a relation between right-wing crime and
unemployment is not merely an eastern phenomenon when considering the level of
unemployment. According to Falk and Zweimliller (2005:9), "specific and historical
circumstances in the new states are responsible for the higher incidence of crime in East
Gennany," leading to the conclusion that once a critical level of unemployment has been
reached, "a further increase in unemployment strongly increases right-wing criminal
activity."
This critical level of unemployment mIrrors the critical level of discontent
illustrated in relative deprivation and further emphasizes the feelings of being left behind
during the process of modernization and dissatisfaction with democratization that have
manifested in eastern Gennany since the reunification (Art, 2007).

Decker and

Miliopoulos (2009) counter that the feeling of losers of modernization is not unique to
eastern Gennany and right-wing extremist attitudes are just as prevalent in western
Gennany. Additionally, Jackman and Volpert (1996) found in their analysis of 16 West
European countries between 1970 and 1990 that "higher rates of unemployment increase
the electoral support of extreme right parties" (Golder, 2003: 526).

In the case of

Gennany, Jackman and Volpert found that "low levels of income [are] not significantly
higher than among those who [perceive themselves as] economically well off' (1996:
505), leading us to believe that unemployment alone does not impact support for rightwing extremist groups.
Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim found that persons of low socio-economic status are
"not likely to support right-wing extremism ideologies unless they also have strong
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mechanisms of social identification" (2004:2). And, while many of the earlier works on
right-wing extremism do not include unemployment as a significant factor of support, per
se (Mudde, 1995; Mudde, 2000), Lubbers and his colleagues (2002) discovered that
competition over resources (such as employment) led to resentment, in which citizens
were less likely to blame people of their own ethnic group, instead blaming out-groups
for economic troubles (see also Tajfel and Turner, 1979). According to Jackman and
Volpert (1996):
"higher rates of unemployment epitomize uneven economic performance that
fosters support for the extreme right by providing the pretext for mounting the
xenophobic political appeals that characterize these political movements.
Increasing unemployment is significant because it provides a fertile environment
for such appeals" (517).
Although controversy remains over the effect of unemployment on support for
right-wing extremism, many scholars agree that it plays an influential role in increasing
anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and nationalistic tendencies, which in tum enhances the
likelihood of support for right-wing extremist groups (Lubbers et aI., 2002; Fireside,
2002; Mudde, 1995; Mudde, 2000, Kitschelt, 1997; Hainsworth, 2000; Jackman and
Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1996; Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim, 2004). To see if xenophobia
facilitates right-wing extremist support, the analyses in chapters four and five test the
hypothesis that: the stronger the perceived conflict with immigrants, the greater the

likelihood that the voter will prefer a right-wing extremist party. Much of the scholarship
relating to xenophobic tendencies includes conversation over economic scarcities, such as
unemployment, in addition to scapegoating foreigners for economic and social maladies.
For this purpose, I have included a measurement of self-perceived economic situation to
account for the previous findings.
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IMMIGRATION
Unlike the controversy surrounding consideration of including unemployment and
socio-economic indicators as influential factors in right-wing extremist support, many
scholars agree on including immigration rates and perceived threats from immigrants as
factors in understanding right-wing extremist support. Racism and xenophobia play an
integral role in right-wing propaganda; right-wing extremist parties often use the theme
of uberfremdung to attract those who feel replaced, either in the society or workplace, by
immigrants. 6 In his 2006 study of right-wing extremism in Germany, Schroeder (2007)
found that among his respondents (N=2,270), 37 percent of Germans (43.8 percent in
eastern and 35.2 percent in western Germany) believed that "foreigners exploit the social
system,,,7 34.9 percent (38.4 percent in eastern and 34.0 percent in western Germany)
agreed that "foreigners in short-supply work places should be shipped back home,,,g and
39.2 percent (40.5 in eastern and 38.8 in western Germany) believed that "Germany is
being infiltrated by foreigners,,9 (Schroeder, 2007: 92). This shows the applicability of
ethnic conflict theory to the situation in eastern Germany.
Recalling the immigration policies discussed in chapter two, it is not surprising
that, given the previous absence of foreigners, eastern Germans feel more competition
toward immigrants. Schroeder (2007) illustrates a clear difference between eastern and
western Germany in regards to attitudes towards foreigners, but he neglects to define the

Dberfremdung is the German word for overt infiltration (of the society) from foreigners
(author's translation). For an example of such propaganda, please see the Republikaner
homepage, illustrated in Appendix A.
7 Original: "Auslander unserer nutzen Socialstaat aus."
g Original: "Auslander bei knapp en Arbeitsplatzen wieder nach Hause schicken."
9 Original: "Deutschland durch Auslander iiberfremdet."

6
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relationship between xenophobic attitudes and actual or latent support for extreme rightwing parties.

Therefore, using a combination of ethnic conflict theory and relative

deprivation, this study examines the hypothesis that those who are more xenophobic, and
perceive immigrants as a threat to resources, are more likely to support right-wing
extremist groups. Important to note is that a voter may hold xenophobic attitudes, but in
holding other issues as more important may decide not to vote based on their antiimmigrant feelings.
As evidenced in the anti-immigrant riots in eastern Germany during the 1990s,
xenophobic attitudes can exist in the absence of a noticeably large immigrant population.
The question, however, is how does this translate into latent support for right-wing
extremist parties? Does a fear of iiberfremdung lead voters to support extreme right
parties? Van der Brug et ai. (2000) claim that "negative attitudes towards immigrants
have a stronger effect on preferences for anti-immigrant parties" when compared to other
parties, and social cleavages are of less importance when determining preferences for
anti-immigrant parties (77). Additionally, Kitschelt (1997 :26) states that "those regions
and countries that had to swallow the heaviest load of immigrants give rise to the
strongest right-wing extremist parties" (cited in Jesuit et aI., 2009: 280). With that logic,
it would follow that right-wing extremist parties should find more support in western
Germany, given that the region has a higher proportion of foreigners to citizens compared
to eastern Germany. Givens (2000) finds support for this claim in both Austria and
France, but not in Germany (cited in Golder, 2003). Kitschelt (1997) further explains
that while one can expect strong support of right-wing parties in areas with high levels of
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immigrants, "right-extremist parties appear both in countries with a small foreign-born
population as well as in those with a large immigrant population" (61).
In this sense, ethnocentrism and xenophobic rhetoric may work as the
"ideological glue" in both attracting diverse sectors of the population (highly-educated
versus lower-educated, white-collar workers versus blue-collar workers), as well as
addressing other socio-economic and sociological factors. Scheepers and his colleagues.
(2002) support including ethnic exclusionism, which reinforces the economic factors,
such as unemployment. The foundations for this theoretical framework lie in competition
over scarcities that lead to hostile inter-group attitudes, regardless of whether there is
actual or perceived competition (Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim,

~004:

6).

Perceptions of economic and social threat are theoretically based in the ethnic
conflict theories, split labor market theory (Bonacich, 1972) and social identity theory
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

Split labor market theory assumes that labor market

competition is the basis for ethnic conflicts, which in this case leads to scapegoating and
a rise for support of right-wing extremist groups. According to the split labor market
theory, when financial security diminishes for any reason, demand to expel cheaper labor
(foreigners and immigrants) from the labor force (Bonacich, 1972).

Social identity

theory, developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979), states that groups are not based on
economic characteristics; rather they are founded upon shared social identification.
Through this social identification, the group creates a fundamental need to perceive itself
as superior to other groups.
Despite the fact that there is little evidence to support the claim that increased
immigration leads to higher rates of unemployment and economic downturns, ethnic
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boundaries are reinforced as competition Increases, which triggers intensified social
group identification.

In order to maintain cohesive and positive social group

identification, out-groups are negatively portrayed and blamed as the source of the
scarcity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2001; Golder, 2003). Most of
these approaches to understanding how perceived threat and immigration affect rightwing extremist support can be linked to relative deprivation, where "members of one
social group feel that in comparison with another social group, they are not getting what
they feel they are entitled to, even if they know that they get more than the other group,"
a situation that leads to increased dissatisfaction (Arzheimer, 2009: 260).
Although Pedahzur and Canetti-Nisim claim that "this so-called perceived threat
cannot be measured in a conclusive way" (2004: 10), many other studies have used antiimmigrant sentiment as a means of measuring perceived threat (Arzheimer, 2009; Kessler
and Freeman, 2005; Jesuit et aI., 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2001; Golder, 2003).
While Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that unemployment directly increased the
success of right-wing extremist parties, they neglected to include an immigration variable
in their specific analysis.

Golder (2003) replicated this study and found a relation

between unemployment and immigration.

Furthermore, Golder found that the

relationship between unemployment and support for right-wing extremist groups was
conditional upon the numbers of immigrants, or perceived threat from immigrants in the
country (2003: 460).
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SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Both unemployment and perceived threats from immigrants contribute to the third
factor in this analysis, satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with democracy. In his case study
on the effectiveness of right-wing ideologies in Germany, Gensing attributes the drastic
social changes that resulted from the quick reunification to a lack of democratic
tendencies in eastern Germany (2009: 65-6). In his opinion, the battle against right-wing
extremism, in which many claim that these groups are a threat to democracy, does not
influence some in eastern Germany, mainly because "the democratic consciousness is not
present in larger segments of the population" (Gensing, 2009: 66).10 The citizens have
become so dissatisfied with their conditions that they are willing to support an antiestablishment party, and in the absence of democratic consciousness citizens vote for
parties, not based on their past performance but rather their campaign promises. In this
case, these promises are based on solving unemployment and creating a "Germany for
Germans." His case study includes interviews with eastern Germans, who expressed
their support for right-wing extremist groups, with many citing dissatisfaction with
democracy, uberfremdung, and feelings of being forgotten as motivating factors. One
retiree claimed that "I do not believe in democracy, because it just takes our money. The
foreigners here have more money than us. Another system would be better. Everyone
should stay in their own country. The Germans in Germany, the Russians in Russia"

"Daher sprechen viele Beobachter beim Kampf gegen den Rechtsextremismus i.n
Teilen Ostdeutschland auch nicht von der Verteidigung der Demokratie. Das
demokratische Bewusstsein gibt es dort in weiten Teilen der Bevolkerung gar nicht."
Author's translation.
10
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(Gensing, 2009: 94). II

.

Gensing further explains that many eastern Germans feel a

disconnection with democracy, claiming that democracy is something that is found in
Berlin or Bonn and has nothing to do with the eastern Germans (2009: 95).
Although many thought that after reunification, democracy would take nearimmediate effect in eastern Germany and political extremism would wane, this has not
been the case (Schoen and BUhler, 2006: 188).

As all right-wing extremist groups

profess anti-democratic ideologies in one form or another, the fear is that as
dissatisfaction with democracy rises, so will support for these parties. This provides the
foundation for the hypothesis that citizens who are dissatisfied with democracy are more

likely to support a right-wing extremist party compared to those who are satisfied with
democracy.

As Schoen and BUhler (2006: 190) explain, many believed that eastern

Germany would be immune to right-wing extremism, given its 40 year anti-fascist state.
However, as explained in chapter two, with little eastern influence in the process and
mandates of reunification, "the eastern Germans became remarkably more dissatisfied
with the possibility of the consequences" (Arzheimer, 2006: 224).12 For this reason, I
also test the hypothesis that citizens in eastern Germany, who 'are less satisfied with

democracy, are more likely to support a right-wing extremist party.
Using Eurobarometer Surveys from 1988, 1994, 1997, and 2000 Kessler and
Freeman (2005) found that the majority of support for right-wing parties comes from

II "Von Demokratie halte ich nichts, [ ... ] weil die einem nur das Geld abnehmen. Die
Auslander hier haben mehr Geld als wir. Am besten ware ein anderes System. Jeder soIl
in seinme Land wohnen. Die Deutschen in Deutschland und die Russen in Russland."
Author's translation.
12 "Dabei sind die Ostdeutschen insgesamt nochmals erkennbar unzufriedener mit ihren
Mitwirkungsmoglichkeiten. Dies gilt wiederum gleichermaBen fUr altere wir fUr jUngere
BUrger." Author's translation.
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young males who hold anti-immigrant attitudes and are less satisfied with democracy.
Political dissatisfaction in this sense is viewed as a form of protest politics, where citizens
choose an anti-establishment party to voice their discontent with what they view as
ineffective traditional parties (Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Hirschman, 1970). Combined
with anti-immigrant sentiments, political dissatisfaction strengthens a voter's support for
right-wing and anti-establishment parties (Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Kitschelt, 1997;
Mudde, 1999; Lubbers et ai., 2002).

Using the hypothesis that the stronger the

perceived conflict with immigrants. the greater the likelihood that the voter will prefer a
right-wing extremist party. it is expected that this study will reflect the findings of
previous studies, as many in eastern Germany attribute an influx of immigrants and
diminishing employment opportunities with the rapid reunification and installation of
democracy.

OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO GERMANY

With previous studies on right-wing extremist groups now reviewed, the next
chapter outlines methods and variables used in investigating the support for right-wing
extremism in Germany. As shown, many of the previous studies have simultaneously
tested unemployment, satisfaction with democracy, and immigration; this study, rather
than looking at the effects for all three variables together, controls for alternative
explanations by removing and replacing variables, which means we can be more
confident in the relative effects of certain factors. All three of these factors for rightwing support are found in eastern and western Germany; however, given the
comparatively short time and the conditions under which eastern Germany has had to
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experiment with democracy, it is highly plausible that these three factors have
individually contributed to a higher rate of right-wing extremist support within eastern
Germany and vary in strength. Whereas western Germany has established democratic
tendencies, eastern Germany is still in the process of internalizing these values. With the
negative repercussions of reunification still present, it is expected that levels of
dissatisfaction with democracy will be higher in eastern Germany, and that this
dissatisfaction will be a primary source of support for right-wing extremist groups. The
next chapter includes preliminary analyses of party preference and the independent
variables, region, employment, education, perceived economic situation, perceived level
of conflict between Germans and immigrants and satisfaction with democracy, and
creates the foundation for the logistic regression models presented in chapter five.
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CHAPTER IV

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the data collection and describe the
dependent and independent variables.

This will set the framework for the logistic

regressions in chapter five which analyze the factors that influence right-wing extremist
support.

Unlike previous studies, this study controls for alternative explanations to

evaluate the relative effects of certain variables on right-wing voter support. The data for
this study were collected from the GESIS Leibniz-Institut fUr Sozialwissenschaften
website on January 15, 2010. The head researchers for the Politbarometer 2005 study
were M. Berger, M. Jung, and D. Roth, from the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen in
Mannheim, Germany. The surveys were administered between January and December
2005 using standardized questions via telephone interviews.

The original data were

separated into two datasets to reflect eastern and western Germany. For this study the
two datasets were combined and coded to reflect the two separate regions.

Prior to

applying a weight, eastern Germany contained a sample of 16,715 cases and western
Germany contained 24,394 cases, for a total of 41,008 cases. After applying the given
overall weight to adjust for oversampling in eastern Germany, the sample size of eastern
Germans dropped to 6,002.
Using the 2005 Politbarometer ensures comparative survey questions and
measurements and, after weighting for an eastern German over sample, is suitable for
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examining differences between the two regions in relation to latent electoral support.
Based on previous studies outlined in the literature review, it is predicted that voters in
eastern Germany will exhibit more openness in voting for right-wing parties. As outlined
in chapters two and three, the egregious unemployment levels and consequences of
reunifications are believed to contribute to democratic dissatisfaction and xenophobic
tendencies.

Furthermore, dissatisfaction with democracy and xenophobic beliefs are

believed to influence right-wing support more than unemployment or other socioeconomic characteristics. This therefore leads us to believe that the data will show more
support for right-wing extremist parties in eastern Germany, which is related to the
relative deprivation and scapegoating of immigrants that followed the reunification.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable, party preference captures the percentages of latent
support for extreme right parties in 2005 and is based on the question, "When you think
of the SPD, CDU, CSU, the Greens, FDP, PDS, Republikaner, NPD, and the DVU:
which of these parties do you prefer?" 13 Although the Politbarometer includes a question
regarding voter intention, I elected to use the variable that reflects party preference, to
adjust for the notorious German strategic voting, in which voters may support a party but
strategically vote for another (Herrmann and Pappi, 2007; Sartori, 1994).

Party

preference reflects the respondent's preference where the respondent was allowed to
select from a number of given political parties. The parties were recoded so that the

13 For the original questionnaire, detailed recoding schemes, and frequency charts, please
see Appendix B. This includes questions used in the cross-tabulations in Part 1.
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right-wing parties (REP, DVU, NPD) represented 1, all other political parties were coded
as 0, regardless of whether the party was a mainstream or minor party.

Similar to

previous studies, right-wing parties were defined and selected using Ignazi's criteria and
investigation of right-wing extremist parties (Jackman and Volpert, 1996: 509; Ignazi,
2003; Hainsworth, 2004). Unknown and not applicable were coded as missing (99).14
Table 4.1 shows an extraordinary amount of support for non-right-wing political parties,
with 82.9 percent preferring mainstream or other political parties over right-wing political
parties. sixteen percent of the respondents either refused to answer or did not have a
party preference, leaving 1.0 percent (1.2 valid percent) preferring right-wing extremist
parties.

Table 4.1 Party Preference

Mainstream or other political party
Right-wing extremist party
Missing
Total

Frequency
25,199
298
4,899
30,396

Percent
82.9
1.0
16.1
100.0

Valid Percent
98.8
1.2
100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The independent variables encompass seven factors believed to influence support
for right-wing extremist parties: region, age, employment, satisfaction with democracy,

perceived level of conflict between immigrants and Germans, education, and self
perceived economic situation.

14 All unknown, not asked, and not available data were coded as missing (99).

47

--------------------------------------------------

Table 4.2 Region of Residence
Frequency
24,393
6,002

Western Germany
Eastern Germany
Missing
Total

o

30,396

Percent
80.3
19.7
0.0
100.0

Valid Percent
80.3
19.7
100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

To account for the residency of each case after merging the two datasets, area of
residence was recoded to reflect region (region)

using a dummy variable, with 1

representing eastern states (Berlin-Ost, Brandenberg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, and ThUringen), and 0 representing western states (SchleswigHolstein, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Bremen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen, RheinlandPfalz, Baden-W-Urttemberg, Bayern, Saarland, and Berlin-West). After weighting for an
oversampling in eastern Germany, we see that the survey adequately reflects the
popUlation distribution in Germany with roughly 20 percent of the population in eastern
Germany and 80 percent in western Germany.
Table 4.3 Age

18-29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50-59 years
60-69 years
70 years and older
Missing
Total

Frequency
4,732
5,430
6,043
4,457
6,048
3,686

o

30,396

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS
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Percent
15.6
17.9
19.9
14.7
19.9
12.1
0.0
100.0

Valid Percent
15.6
17.9
19.9
14.7
19.9
12.1
0.0
100.0

Age l5 was coded categorically using ten year increments for convenience of
presentation and is based on the original categorically coded data (18-29, 30-39, etc.).
Looking at Table 4.3, we see a fairly even distribution among the categories, with
percentages ranging from 12.1 percent (70 and older) to 19.9 percent (40-49 years).
There are no missing cases for this variable.
Table 4.4 Employment

Not in work force
Employed
Unemployed
Missing
Total

Frequency
12,118
16,443
1,404
431
30,396

Percent
39.9
54.1
4.6
1.4
100.0

Valid Percent
40.4
54.9
4.7
0.0
100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

Employment status 16 was originally coded into ten different categories and was
recoded so that 1 reflected employment (either full or part time), 2 reflected currently
unemployed, 0 reflected those out of the workforce (retirement, pensioner, non-workers,
university or civil duty). Table 4.4 shows 39.9 percent of the respondents as not being in
the work force, leaving a total 58.7 percent eligible for placement in the workforce.
However, 54.1 percent are actually employed. These findings do not reflect the actual
unemployment data, which typically range from 8.0 percent to, in some regions, over
20.0 percent.
While unemployment is often used a proxy for the public's economic perception,
it fails to capture the public's attitude towards the economy. Although the employment
variable measures a respondent's employment status, it fails to recognize the perceived

15
16

Survey question: How old are you?
Survey question: Are you currently employed?
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economic situation. One may be employed but still dissatisfied with his or her current
economic status. Fortunately, the Politbarometer includes a variable that examines the
respondents' perception of their own economic situation. The question, "How would you
describe your current economic situation?" captures the respondent's own perceived
current economic situation. While it is expected that those who are unemployed will also
perceive their situation negatively, we must also account for variations. As shown in
Table 4.5, a majority of the respondents believe their personal economic situation to be
either sometimes good!sometimes bad or good rather than poor (87.3 percent versus 12.5
percent).
Table 4.5 Perceived Personal Economic Situation

Poor
Sometimes good! sometimes bad
Good
Missing
Total

Frequency
3,811
12,273
14,247
65
30,396

Percent
12.5
40.4
46.9
0.2
100.0

Valid Percent
12.6
40.5
47.0

100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

Unemployment and perceptions of their economIC situation are not the only
influential factors in right-wing extremist support. Satisfaction with democracy taps into
the level of dissatisfaction for the democratic institutions (Knigge, 1998: 260). Table 4.6
shows a slight difference in the levels of satisfaction with democracy, with only 2.4
percent difference. However, compared to the previous variables, there is a substantial
amount of missing data because this question was not asked during several weeks.
Nonetheless, despite the missing data, there are 8,703 valid cases for this variable, which
is enough to avoid the problem of a small sample size.
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Table 4.6 Satisfaction with Democracy
Frequency
4,456
4,247
21,693
30,396

Satisfied
Dissatisfied
Missing
Total

Percent
14.7
14.0
71.4
100.0

Valid Percent
51.2
48.8
100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

As noted in chapters two and three, many right-wing extremist parties blame
immigrants for nationals' problems and propose seemingly simple solutions to these
problems, particularly stopping immigration to lower unemployment.

As previous

studies show, there are some indications that the perceived effects of immigration are
conditional on the pervasiveness of unemployment (Knigge, 1998: 260). Anti-immigrant
sentiment is measured by the question, "In all societies there are conflicts between
different social groups. How do you evaluate the conflicts here in Germany? Are the
conflicts between immigrants and Germans ... " where the respondents selected the level
of conflict they believed best represented their perceptions. Similar to the satisfaction
with democracy variable, this question was not asked throughout the year, resulting in a
substantial amount of missing data.

Nonetheless, as shown in Table 4.7, we see a

majority of the respondents perceived a strong or very strong level of conflict between
Germans and immigrants (total of 56.4 percent).

Nearly forty-four percent of the

respondents perceived either a weak conflict or no conflict between immigrants and
Germans.
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Table 4.7 Perceived Level of Conflict between Immigrants and Germans
Frequency
42
485
516
165
1,208
29,188
30,396

No conflict
Not so strong
Strong
Very strong
Total
Missing
Total

Percent
0.1
1.6
1.7
0.5
4.0
96.0
100.0

Valid Percent
3.4
40.l
42.7
13.7
100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

The final variable in this analysis, education, tests the claim that citizens with a
higher level of education are less likely to support an anti-establishment or right-wing
extremist party. Additionally, it is assumed that those with a lower level of education are
also more likely to evaluate negatively their personal economic situation and be more
likely to adapt the anti-immigrant sentiment of the right-wing extremist parties. Table
4.8 shows that only 29.7 percent of the respondents were either still enrolled in school or
had below a high school education. Most of the respondents had received either a high
school diploma or university preparation (total 64.2 percent), with only 6.1 percent
holding a professional or university degree.

Table 4.8 Education

Still in school, no degree
8th grade
High school
University prep
Professional degree
University-level
Missing
Total

Frequency
108
8,883
10,227
9,234
456
1,396
90
30,396

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS
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Percent
0.4
29.2
33.6
30.4
1.5
4.6
0.3
100.0

Valid Percent
0.4
29.3
33.7
30.5
1.5
4.6
100.0

Prior to evaluating how all of these variables collectively influence support for
right-wing extremist parties, it is essential to examine how these variables interact with
each other. Table 4.9 mirrors the official electoral results, showing that the right-wing
extremist parties received 1.2 percent of the vote.

This also shows the relationship

between region and party preference, indicating slightly more support (0.5 percent) in
eastern Germany when compared to western Germany. However, these findings show a
slight difference in voter support for right-wing extremist parties within the regions, with
eastern Germany slightly more accepting by 0.5 percent. These findings are significant at
the 0.05 level and lend support to the hypothesis that voters in eastern Germany are more
accepting of right-wing extremist parties.
Table 4.9 Region and Party Preference

Right-Wing Party
Other
Total

West
l.1
98.9
100.0
20,609

Percent
Percent
Total Percent
Total Count

East
1.6
98.4
100.0
4,888

Total
1.2
98.8
100.0
25,497

Chi-Square Tests, Value: 10.481, df: 1, Asymp. Sig. (2-sided): 0.001
Number of valid cases: 25,497

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS
In examining what promotes support for right-wing extremist parties, the
relationship between party preference and the perceived level of conflict between
Germans and immigrants (shown in Table 4.10) shows that many Germans feel that the
level of conflict between immigrants and Germans is very strong, regardless of political
party preference. However, these findings do show that none of the respondents who
preferred the right-wing extremist parties felt that there was no conflict between Germans
and immigrants. These findings are significant at the 0.05 level; however, they fail to
provide support for the claim that citizens who perceive a high level of conflict between
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immigrants and Germans are more likely to support right-wing extremist parties. This
does not refute the claim that citizens who harbor xenophobic sentiments are more likely
to support right-wing extremist parties. As stated before, the 2005 Politbarometer does
not include a question that can better measure levels of xenophobia, such as "What do
you think of the number of immigrants in Germany? 1) not enough, 2) enough, 3) too
. many." For this reason, the perceived level of conflict between immigrants and Germans
is used as a proxy.

Table 4.10 Party Preference and Perceived Level of Conflict between Immigrants
and Germans

Right-Wing Party
Other
Total

Percent
Percent
Percent
Count

Not so
strong
0.2
99.8
100.0
444

conflict
0.0
100.0
100.0
35

Strong
2.4
97.6
100.0
457

Very
Strong
7.3
92.7
100.0
150

Total
2.1
97.9
100.0
1,086

Chi-Square Tests, Value: 28.296, df: 3, Asymp. Sig. (2-sided): 0.000
Number of Valid Cases: 1,086
Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

Instead, the perceived level of conflict can be used to measure the acceptance of
foreigners between the two regions. As Table 4.11 shows, citizens in eastern Germany
are more likely to believe that there is a strong or very strong conflict between
immigrants and foreigners in Germany. This can be attributed to the rapid influx of
foreigners into eastern Germany following the reunification, and the spread of neo-Nazi
and extreme right movements that have proliferated through eastern Germany
(Rensmann, 2003: 94). These movements use immigrants as scapegoats form the
unemployment rates and problems with reunification. These findings are not significant
at the 0.05 level, but are close enough to lend some credence to the statement that citizens
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in eastern Germany are more likely to perceive a strong level of conflict between
immigrants and Germans.
Table 4.11 Region and Perceived Level of Conflict between Immigrants and
Germans

No conflict
Not so strong
Strong
Very Strong
Total

Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Count

West
3.7
41.2
42.6
12.5
100.0
976

East
2.6
35.3
43.5
18.5
100.0
232

Total
3.5
40.1
42.8
13.7
100.0
1,208

Chi-Square Tests, Value: 7.286, df: 3, Asymp. Sig. (2-sided): 0.063
Number of Valid Cases: 1,208
Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

I tested the claim that right-wing extremists are more likely to be dissatisfied with
democracy, and Table 4.12 shows a positive relationship between party preference for
right-wing extremists and dissatisfaction with democracy. This analysis shows that 2.2
percent of those respondents who are dissatisfied with democracy favored right-wing
extremist parties. Only 0.2 percent of those who were satisfied with democracy were
likely to support right-wing extremist parties. These findings support the claim that

citizens who are dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to support a right-wing
extremist party compared to citizens who are satisfied with democracy. The findings also
support the theoretical expectations based on relative deprivation and protest voting in
that, the more dissatisfied people are with democracy, the more likely they are to support
a right-wing extremist party.
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Table 4.12 Party Preference and Satisfaction with Democracy

Right-Wing Party
Other
Total

Satisfied
0.2
99.8
100.0
4,063

Percent
Percent
Percent
Count

Dissatisfied
2.2
97.8
100.0
3,580

Total
1.2
98.8
100.0
7,643

Chi-Square Tests, Value: 62.457, df: 1, Asymp. Sig. (2-sided): 0.000
Number of Valid Cases: 7,643

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

While the previous analysis examines party preference and satisfaction with
democracy, it does not show the difference in levels of satisfaction across regions.
Remembering that 0 represents dissatisfaction and 1 represents satisfaction, Table 4.13
shows a positive correlation between dissatisfaction with democracy and region, with a
higher level of dissatisfaction in eastern Germany (74.4 percent). Knowing from the
previous analysis that democratic satisfaction is weaker among right-wing supporters,
this provides the initial support for the hypothesis that citizens in eastern Germany, who
are less satisfied with democracy, are more likely to support right-wing extremist parties.

The current analysis cannot, however, rule out the influence of intervening variables that
may also influence voter behaviors. Logistic regression analysis will be needed to show
more of a relation.
Table 4.13 Region and Satisfaction with Democracy

Percent Satisfied
Percent Dissatisfied
Total Percent
Total Count

West
86.0
14.0
100.0
4,456

East
74.4
25.6
100.0
4,247

Chi-Square Test, Value: 184.293, df: 1, Asymp. Sig. (2-sided): 0.000
Number of Valid Cases: 8,703

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS
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Total
80.4
19.6
100.0
8,703

Using perceived economic situation instead of unemployment (see next page), we
see in Table 4.14 that those who rated their situation as "poor" were more likely to
choose an extremist right-wing party as their first party preference. Furthermore, those
who described their economic situation as "sometimes good! sometimes bad" were also
more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties, when compared to respondents who
had a positive evaluation of their economic situation. These preliminary findings lend
credence to the statement that those who perceive their economic condition as belowaverage are more likely to support an extreme right-wing party when compared to those
who have a "good" economic situation.
Table 4.14 Perceived Economic Situation and Party Preference

Poor
Sometimes good! sometimes bad
Good
Total

Right-wing parties
31.0
48.6
22.2
100.0
297

Percent
Percent
Percent
Percent
Count

Other
11.6
39.6
48.8
100.0
25,167

Total
11.8
39.7
39.7
100.0
25,464

Chi-Square Test, Value: l39.5l3, df: 2, Asymp. Sig. (2-sided): 0.000
Number of Valid Cases: 8703
Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

OVERVIEW

Although the cross tabulations shown above help to define a relationship between
two variables, they do not eliminate the possibility that an increase in one variable (for
example, employment) is the by-product of another variable's interference (for example,
region).

As expected, there is evidence of a relation among region of residence,

satisfaction with democracy, and perceived economic situation related to the respondent's
party preference. The level of conflict between immigrants and Germans and region are
only slightly significant. The cross-tabulations can indicate relationships between two
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variables, but they fail to control for alternative explanations simultaneously. Because
the dependent variable, party preference, is dichotomous I employed a logistic regression,
which holds all other the variables at their mean, while measuring the impact of a single
variable (Knigge, 1997, 261; Lubbers et aI., 2002: 361). The independent variables are
region, self perceived economic situation, sex, age, education, and employment status,
perceived level of conflict between immigrants and Germans and satisfaction with
democracy. With the relationships between selected variables now established, chapter
five continues to examine how the combined variables affect support for right-wing
political parties and leads to an interesting discovery about the impact of satisfaction with
democracy and perceived conflict with immigrants on party preference, which supports
the findings from this chapter's cross-tabulations.
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CHAPTER V

INFERENTIAL STATISTICS
THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

In line with previous studies, it is expected that region, personal perceived
economic situation, sex, age, education level, immigration, employment, and democratic
satisfaction will positively correspond to support for right-wing extremism. According to
most studies on voter behavior and right-wing extremism, group conflicts are the primary
source of the right-wing extremist groups' success (Arzheimer, 2009: 260). Ranging
from classic theories of scapegoating to ethnic conflict theories, these theoretical
explanations include xenophobia (in this case a consequence of a strong conflict between
immigrants and natives over resources, such as jobs and welfare benefits) and rely
heavily on the theory of relative deprivation. However, as Jesuit et ai. (2009) and DUlmer
and Klein (2005) theorize, "if there are no immigrants to be blamed ... for actually or
potentially taking away jobs, there is no reason why unemployment itself should cause
right-wing voting (see also Lubbers et aI., 2002; Knigge, 1998). Furthermore, Golder
(2003b) has found little theoretical or empirical evidence to link increased immigration
rates with increased unemployment (Golder, 2003b).
With a relatively low immigrant population in eastern Germany, according to this
logic, unemployment should play little if any role in the levels of support for right-wing
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extremist groups. It can then be assumed that an overall dissatisfaction with the current
democratic state is to blame for an increased amount for right-wing extremism support in
eastern Germany. Leading causes of democratic dissatisfaction are linked to relative
deprivation. As relative deprivation rises, meaning that the members of a social group
become increasingly dissatisfied as expected results fail to materialize (Gurr, 1970;
Pettigrew, 2002; Arzheimer, 2009).

As noted before, immigrants have been identified

by right-wing extremist groups as the reason for social problems, such as rising
unemployment rates and a poor economic situation. I expect to find a positive influence
from both perceived economic situation and democratic dissatisfaction, given that eastern
Germans have yet to experience the full benefits of reunification promised to them by
Chancellor Kohl during the reunification.
These increased levels of democratic dissatisfaction can be related to the creation
of democratic norms.

Democracy is not merely an institution; it also requires the

internalization of democratic tendencies,

such as

emancipation (Ingelhart and Welzel, 2005: 271).

free-choice,

autonomy and

If the preconceived notions of

democracy create unrealistically high expectations, as seen in eastern Germany during
reunification, an increasing discrepancy between expectations and reality will lead to
disillusionment and, in some cases, protest voting and dissatisfaction with the status quo
(Ingelhart and Welzel, 2005: 120; Gurr, 1970; Hirschman, 1970; Hirschman, 1993). This
disillusionment, as Ingelhart and Welzel (2005: 119) state, "may lead to declining support
for democracy, if support is not intrinsically rooted in self-expression values."
Furthermore, democratic tendencies are not implemented instantaneously; they
are learned slowly through political socialization and experience. This leads to a dual set

60

of conflicting expectations regarding age and democratic satisfaction, and in tum support
for right-wing extremist support. First, it is expected that older citizens, 40 and older, are
more likely not to support right-wing extremists because of the political socialization
experienced during the 40 years of the anti-fascist GDR regime. Therefore, it is expected
that younger citizens are less likely to support right-wing extremists.

The second

expectation, based on Watts's case study on racism and ideology among eastern German
youth (Watts, 1996), is that younger, more disadvantaged and disillusioned citizens will
be more prone to support right-wing extremist groups ..

METHODS

The hypotheses related to factors that facilitate right-wing extremist support are
tested using data from the Politbarometer 2005. Conducted yearly, the Politbarometer is
very similar to the Eurobarometer and is a primary data source for tracking and analyzing
fluctuations in German political and social attitudes. For this research I pooled responses
from both East and West Politbarometer 2005 surveys, which have identical questions, to
create a full dataset with eastern and western German respondents. 17
The selected variables consist of attitudinal measures, which provide considerable
insight into individual-level support for right-wing extremist parties (see also Kessler and
Freeman, 2005; Ignazi, 1992; Betz, 1994; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002).

Although

Robinson (1950) noted that "individual-level correlation may be much weaker or may
even reverse its sign, working in the opposite direction from the relationship found at the

17 An exact coding scheme is found in Appendix B; exact methodology, descriptives, and
frequency tables are found in Chapter four.
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aggregate level" (Ingelhart and Welzel, 2005: 231), Ingelhart and Welzel (2005) note that
to ignore individual-level data would invalidate democratic theory, pointing out that
individual-level preferences are often "aggregated into a societal-level phenomenon" akin
to the "will of the people" (232).

Furthermore, a vast majority of the literature on

political culture is grounded in the assumption that "aggregated individual-level values
and beliefs have in impact on societal-level phenomena" (Ingelhart and Welzel, 2005:
232). Since the following analysis is based on a logistic regression model, the binomial
distribution of party preference is "assumed to adequately account for randomness at the
individual level" (Arzheimer, 2009: 266-267). Furthermore, I avoid case selection bias
by including all respondents in Germany, rather than singling out eastern or western
Germany, and by opting to conduct an analysis of one year, rather than a cross-time
analysis (Geddes, 2003). After a brief description of the models and results, a discussion
concerning the influences of significant variables, results, and application to right-wing
extremist support follows.
In order to analyze the isolated effects of satisfaction with democracy and
conflicts with immigrants, I created four models to show the distinct relationships
between the variables. Sample sizes vary throughout the models, ranging from 33,692 in
Model 1 to 1,393 in Model 4. Because the questions on democratic satisfaction and
attitudes on immigrants were not asked throughout the year, in both Models 3 and 4 the
sample size is radically reduced. To highlight the change in regional effect on support for
right-wing extremism, I have shown the explicit P-values for region. The significance for
all other variables is denoted by an asterisk.
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The first model (Ml) measures the effect of regIOn, economIC situation,
employment, age, and education on party preference. In Model l, we see that region
plays a significant role in support for right-wing extremist parties; therefore, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that there is no effect of region on support for right-wing
extremist groups.

This supports the claim that eastern Germans are more likely to

support right-wing extremist parties. Model 2 (M2) includes satisfaction with democracy
and shows that the effect of region on right-wing extremist parties is explained by levels
of dissatisfaction with democracy.
Model 3 (M3), which replaces satisfaction with democracy with conflict with
immigrants, shows that immigration also explains the effect of region on right-wing
extremist parties. Model 4 (M4) examines party preference for right-wing extremist
groups using both satisfaction with democracy and conflict with immigrants, and shows
that immigration plays a larger role in explaining the variation in region than satisfaction
with democracy.

In fact, Model 4 shows that satisfaction with democracy, when

combined with immigration, is no longer as significant.

Thus, the variation in support

for right-wing extremism explained by region, at first glance, seems to be more reliably
explained by satisfaction with democracy.

Upon further examination, the variation

explained by satisfaction with democracy can actually be accounted for the attitudes
about immigrants.
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Table 5.1 Models of Party Preference and Right-Wing Extremism

Region
P-Value
Economic Situation
Employment
Age
Education

M1

M2

M3

M4

0.48
(0.14)
0.00*

0.29
(0.26)
0.27

0.06
(0.55)
0.92

-0.82
(0.59)
0.89

-0.72*
(0.08)
0.13
(0.10)
-0.26*
(0.04)
-0.54*
(0.08)

-0.58*
(0.16)
-0.11
(0.19)
-0.31 *
(0.08)
-0.50*
(0.14)
1.91 *
(0.35)

-0.62
(0.33)
-0.33
(0.41)
-0.30*
(0.15)
-0.36
(0.28)

1.33*
(0.34)

-.057
(0.35)
-0.60
(0.44)
-0.35*
(0.16)
-0.24
(0.30)
1.01
(0.63)
1.22*
(0.36)

0.17
1,412

0.19
1,393

Satisfaction/Democracy
Attitude/Immigration

Pseudo R2
N

0.07
33,692

0.13
10,038

Note: Data come from the Politbarometer 2005. Table entries are logit estimates. 2-tailed
test *p:S 0.05, +p:s 0.l0. P-Value represents the probability that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that there is no effect of region on support for right-wing extremism. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
MODEL 1
Looking at region, we find that as region increases from 0 (West) to 1 (East),
party preference for right-wing extremist groups also increases. In this model, perceived
economic situation, age, and education are significant at the 0.05 level. This model
supports the hypothesis that voters in eastern Germany are more accepting a/right-wing
extremist parties and reflects the findings of the initial cross-tabulation.

Self-perceived economic situation shows a negative correlation with support for
right-wing extremist groups, meaning that the more negatively one believes their
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economIC situation IS, the less likely they are to support a right-wing party.

With

significance levels of 0.000, we can reject the hypothesis that those who perceive their

economic condition as below-average are more likely to support an extreme right-wing
party when compared to those who have a "good" economic situation. This coincides
with the null relationship between right-wing extremist support and employment status.
Employment is found not to be a significant factor in determining support for right-wing
extremist groups (at a level of 0.207). Therefore, like many studies before, we find little
support for the statement that those who are unemployed are more likely to support right-

wing extremist parties.
We find a slightly negative correlation with age and right-wing extremist support,
with a significance level of 0.000 at the 0.05 level. This means that as people age, they
are less likely to support right-wing parties and upholds the claim that political
socialization under the socialist government acts as a deterrent to preferring right-wing
parties.

Similarly, education is also negatively correlated with right-wing party

preference.

This relation between right-wing extremism supports the influence of

education found previous studies, in that the higher one's education level, the less likely
one is to prefer a right-wing extremist party.

MODEL 2
When we include satisfaction with democracy in the analysis, we find that region
is no longer significant. This means that the dissatisfaction with democracy explains the
regional differences found in Model 1. While education is a significant indicator in this
analysis of support for right-wing extremist behavior, we can also assume that those with
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feelings of relative deprivation are less likely to support the democratic institutions that
have failed to effectively introduce policies which will reduce those feelings of relative
deprivation. Learning democracy requires political participation and personal initiative,
which while present during the initial stages of reunification, have now faded as
conditions have worsened. Joslyn and Cigler (2001) note that associational activities also
influence one's democratic dispositions; however, due to the massive loss of jobs many
eastern Germans lost their associational ties to other citizens. This can also be a potential
reason for the lack of democratic satisfaction in eastern Germany.
Interestingly, similar to the previous model, employment remains insignificant.
Democratic satisfaction has a positive coefficient of 1.910 with preference for right-wing
extremist parties, meaning that as dissatisfaction with democracy increases, the likelihood
of preferring a right-wing extremist party also increases. This is an interesting finding
and supports the existing statements that right-wing parties attract those who are feeling a
sense of relative deprivation and have, therefore, chosen to use their electoral voice as an
anti-establishment protest.
This, however, does not mean that all eastern Germans are supportive of rightwing extremists or dissatisfied with democracy. I suspect that as time progresses and
economic conditions improve, eastern Germans will become more satisfied with
democracy and therefore find little reason to support anti-establishment right-wing
extremist parties. Democratic tendencies are not innate and must be developed over time.
When comparing eastern and western Germany it is important to remember the process in
which democratic tendencies develop: western Germany has a 40 year head start on
eastern Germany. Only with time, patience, and education will this disparity decrease.

66

In the mean while, this leads us to the question of what creates dissatisfaction with
democracy. A model of satisfaction with democracy, along with its interpretation is
included in Appendix C.

MODELS 3 and 4

Model 3 replaces Model 2' s satisfaction with democracy with perceived levels of
conflict between immigrants and Germans. The model shows that, like satisfaction with
democracy, attitudes towards foreigners also explain the regional differences in support
for right-wing extremist parties. Furthermore, the variation explained by satisfaction
with democracy is, as shown in Table 5.1, accounted for by attitudes on immigration. In
Models 3 and 4 only age and immigration are significant at the 0.05 level. Although age
is not a significant factor in determining dissatisfaction with democracy, as shown in
Table 5.2 (shown in Appendix C), when used in the other models it remains a significant
factor in support for right-wing extremist pasties.

The negative coefficient provides

support to the claims that those who experienced the GDR are more socialist-oriented and
therefore more immune to right-wing extremist groups. It has been noted that ideological
identification is acquired early in life (Sears et aI., 1980) and that ideology "operates in a
nearly emotional level" (Jacoby, 1991: 180). Furthermore, emotions associated with
external events (helplessness and anger) often have a stronger influence on evaluation of
political systems (Conover and Feldman, 1986). Having experienced 40 years of the
repressive East German socialist regime, it is plausible that although eastern German
democracy is not perfect, the older citizens who can compare the current system to the
GDR are happier under the new system.
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Model 4 shows similar results as Model 3 with age and attitudes towards
immigration remaining significant and explaining the difference in regional support for
right-wing extremist parties. This reaffirms the findings of Model 3 in that regional
differences in party preference are linked to age and the perceived level of conflicts with
immigrants, meaning that xenophobic citizens are more likely to support right-wing
extremist groups, especially in eastern Germany. Unfortunately, the Politbarometer 2005
does not include measures of indicators of xenophobia (such as level of immigrants in the
respondent's town or respondent's feelings towards foreigners); therefore, we must rely
on the previous theoretical frameworks, relative deprivation, protest voting, and ethnic
conflict theories, to understand the factors which influence xenophobia and a higher
level of perceived conflict with foreigners.
According to Frederick Weil (1993), distrust for immigrants is not closely related
to anti-democratic attitudes. However, xenophobia is often higher among younger and
less-educated citizens who harbor feelings of relative deprivation (Klingemann and
Hofferbert, 1994). Furthermore, as economic conditions worsen and grievances increase,
right-wing extremist parties using foreigners as scapegoats (Braunthal, 2009: 11).
Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the perceived conflict between immigrants and
Germans influence support for right-wing extremist parties more than the level of
satisfaction with democracy.

This directly relates to the ethnic group competition

theory, in that those not included in the in-group are considered a threat to economic and
social resources. As immigrants are seen as a threat to society, it is understandable that
those who are most vulnerable to worsening economic conditions and already dissatisfied
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with the current system would resort to supporting a political party that proposes to
eliminate immigrants, which they see as the main source of the problems.

OVERVIEW

Through the models we find that there is evidence that both perceived level of
conflict with immigrants and dissatisfaction with democracy influence support for rightwing extremist parties more than does region.

Furthermore, from the discussion on

reunification and the cross-tabulations in chapter four, we know that both of these factors
are more prevalent in eastern Germany. Therefore, it can be assume that right-wing
extremist groups do feed off of the post-reunification resentments and utilize these
feelings of relative deprivation in eastern Germany to gain electoral support.

These

dissatisfactions are directly related to the consequences of reunification and unfulfilled
expectations. The current situation in eastern Germany, high unemployment rates and a
high level of dissatisfaction, provide an ideal opportunity for eastern Germans to voice
their discontent by voting for right-wing parties as a sign of protest against the current
system.

The well-intended quick reunification paved the path for inequalities and

dissatisfaction which, as shown in these analyses, have been used by right-wing extremist
parties to gain support.

Since legal actions and proposed bans have proved nearly

impossible to reinforce, only by addressing the eastern German concerns and improving
the economic and social conditions can the government prevent the expansion of these
parties and their increasing support in eastern Germany.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this study, the motivational factors for supporting right-wing extremism in
Germany were shown to have a strong relation to satisfaction with democracy. In chapter
two, the ramifications of the German reunification were explained and used to establish
the massive inequalities that the right-wing extremist parties exploit in order to gain
electoral support. Chapter three detailed the previous literature on right-wing extremist
support, and provides the necessary support for establishing the framework of this
investigation of right-wing extremist support in Germany.

Using mostly socio-

economically based variables, chapter four provided a preliminary examination of
potential motivations of right-wing extremist groups, such as age, unemployment, region,
dissatisfaction with democracy, and perceived level of conflict with immigrants.
Chapter five went beyond these preliminary examinations and employs multiple
models based on logistic regression, finding that above all, conflicts with immigrants and
dissatisfaction with democracy play the most influential role in determining support for
right-wing extremist groups.

The cross-tabulations in chapter four showed that both of

these factors are more prevalent in eastern Germany. From these findings, it is safe to
conclude that the ethnic conflict theories, where out-groups are blamed for problems,
combined with the negative repercussions of reunification, lead to a few immigrants to be
successfully used as scapegoats, thus contributing to support for right-wing extremism.
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Additionally, this study showed that eastern Gennans are still in the progress of "learning
democracy" and the dissatisfaction with democratic institutions is grounded in relative
deprivation.

Since 1990, eastern Gennans have experienced an identity crisis while

transitioning to democracy. Some believe that socialism was better, while others have
become completely dissatisfied, enough to lend their support to the anti-establishment
right-wing extremist political parties. While right-wing extremism is not a phenomenon
isolated only to Gennany, this preliminary investigation finds many variables that can be
used in an expanded investigation of right-wing extremist support.

METHODOLOGICAL SHORTFALLS
One of the biggest problems faced when examining right-wing extremist support
involves the social surveys and censored data. As many social surveys only investigate
voter intent or voter preferences for mainstream parties, the selection of data usable for
such an investigation of right-wing extremism is extremely limited. Right-wing extremist
political parties do not appear often as selection choices on social surveys, thereby
rendering those surveys unusable for any investigation into right-wing extremist support.
Additionally, had this research concentrated on mainstream parties, or even extreme left
parties, ALLBUS survey data would have been perhaps more appropriate as it includes
many more cases and many more variables that can be used to investigate voter behavior.
Another problem faced with this study is the phenomenon of social desirability.
Although the surveys were conducted via telephone interviews, thereby increasing the
distance between the interviewer and respondent, the survey cannot rule out the desire to
fit into social nonns that respondents feel. While it is plausible to use multiple variables
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to seek the exact ideological preferences of respondents, thereby narrowmg the
respondents actual political party preferences, it is not possible to eliminate the threat of
social desirability that is present in any social survey.
Additionally, more sophisticated models, such as a Tobit model, would provide
more insight as to how variables interact with each other to influence right-wing
extremist models.

A Tobit model, used in other studies, rather than holding other

variables at their means like with a logistic regression model, controls for the interaction
of certain variables.

While using crosstabulations also helps to understand the

relationship between certain factors, a Tobit model renders a more sophisticated and
precise model for estimating factors which influence voter behavior.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES

In investigation German voter behavior, ideally, I would create a cross-time
analysis covering elections from 1991 to 2005. A cross-time analysis would help us to
evaluate the effects of public policy (such as social welfare program cutbacks, political
scandals) and other events (such as terrorist attacks, international turmoil, etc.) have on
the levels of support for right-wing extremist groups. It is suspected that with the rise of
Islamophobia sparked by the events September 11, right-wing extremism also increased.
In addition, it is expected that public opinion will be influenced by other events in
Europe, such as the minaret ban in Switzerland. However, given the resource limitations,
in addition to inconsistent survey questions between 1991 and 2005, a snap-shot
comparison between eastern and western Germany sufficed to explain the factors which
influence right-wing voter behavior in the united Germany.
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Concentrating on the 2005 elections also reflects the availability of social survey
data, as the 2009 Politbarometer has yet to be published. Another possible improvement
would be the inclusion of ALLBUS survey data. The problem, however, with combining
ALLBUS and Politbarometer data is that they are two separate surveys, conducted in
different fashions.

Another suggestion would be to compare the results from the

ALLBUS and Politbarometer surveys to check for similarities or differences in the
results.

Although this is a preliminary study of the influences on right-wing extremism,

the parsimonious investigation relies solely on social survey and neglects to control for
actual election, unemployment, and immigration data. This may not be an especially
serious limitation. As evidenced in previous studies, sometimes the perceived levels of
immigrants and level of perceived threats are more important that actual immigration
rates. Nonetheless, including the actual levels of immigration and unemployment data
would also help to see how actual events influence voter behavior.
Also, like many other studies, it would be more beneficial to understand the
differences between several countries. Not only would this help us understand how
political systems (parliamentarian versus majoritarian system) influence right-wing
extremist support, but also see how cultural aspects that vary from country to country
play into right-wing extremism support.

These institutional and cultural variables might

be used to explain why extreme right-wing political parties have gained more support in
France, Switzerland, France, and Italy compared to Ireland, Spain or the new
democracies of the former Soviet Union.
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OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

Despite the parsimonious nature of this study, it provides valuable insight into the
motivations and factors that influence voters to support right-wing extremist groups.
Dissatisfaction with democracy is shown to be the primary motivating factor in
determining the party preferences, with a positive relation between dissatisfaction with
democracy and support for right-wing extremist political parties.

In addition, the

analyses show that dissatisfaction with democracy is linked with the negative
consequences of reunification.
Although hindsight is often 20/20, using the historical analysis, it can be assumed
that if the German governments had enforced a slower, more thorough option of
reunification, satisfaction with democracy might be higher in eastern Germany,
suggesting that the right-wing extremist groups would not find as much support in eastern
Germany. Moreover, had the governments slowly integrated immigrants into the eastern
regions, perhaps the levels of conflicts with immigrants would be lower, thereby leading
to a decreased amount of right-wing extremist support in eastern Germany.

The

differences in voter behavior between eastern and western Germany are directly related to
the perception of the effects of reunification. That said, the differing levels of support for
right-wing extremist groups (on the federal level) between eastern and western Germany
are not enough to raise alarms. What is more alarming, as shown in many case studies, is
the increasing prevalence of right-wing extremist groups in eastern German local
governments, compared to western Germany.

This supports the idea that although

eastern Germans are more likely to support right-wing extremists on the local level, they
strategically elect not to support these parties on the same level in federal elections.
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After 40 years of socialism, it is not surpnsmg that many question the
internalization of democratic tendencies within eastern Germany.

Twenty years after

reunification, eastern Germans are still learning the lessons of democracy, even if it
means experimenting with right-wing extremist parties. It is expected that, as economic
situations improve, satisfaction with democracy with increase and lead to an overall
decrease in support for the anti-establishment right-wing extremist parties. Although this
is a presumptuous claim, given that this analysis only examined one election, previous
studies have shown that, with time, satisfaction with democracy increases. As this is a
key indicator of support for right-wing parties, the estimation that right-wing extremism
support with decrease over time is validated.
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Appendix A
Right-wing Extremist Anti-Immigrant Campaign Propaganda

Exploiting xenophobic fears of a cultural takeover by immigrants, right-wing parties often distort
the actual effects of immigration, often targeting Muslims and those who are distinctly nonEuropean.
Source: Die Republikaner, available at http://www.rep.de/ Last accessed March 18,20 10.
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Appendix B
Variables and Recoding Scheme
Example:
variable name
Original question in Gennan (translation)
1. First original option (translation)
2. Second original option (translation)
Recoded options
1. First recoded option (number in original options)
2. Second recoded option (number in original options)
<Frequency Table (after recoding, weight applied»

Dependent Variable
Party Preference

Mainstream or other political party
Right-wing extremist party
Missing
Total

Frequency
25,199
298
4,899
30,396

Percent
82.9
1.0
16.1
100.0

Valid Percent
98.8
1.2
100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS.
Und nun noch einmal zu den Parteien in Deutschland ganz allgemein: Wenn Sie einmal die SPD,
die CDU, die CSU, die Griinen, die FDP, die PDS, die Republikaner, die NPD und die DVU
denken: Welche dieser Parteien gefallt Ihnen am besten? (And now again to the political parties
in Germany in general: When you think of the SPD, CDU, CSu, the Greens, FDP, PDS,
Republikaner, NPD, and the DVU: which of these parties do you prefer?)
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
99.

SPD
CDU
CSU
Griinen
FDP
PDS
WASG (only in weeks 25 and 27)
Republikaner
NPD
DVU
Keine Ahnung! Split (47, 49)

Recoded options:
00. Mainstream party/other (01-07: SPD, CDU, CSu, the Greens, FDP, and PDS)
01. Right-wing extremist party (08-10: Republikaner, NPD, and the DVU)
99. Don't know (99)

Independent Variables
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Region

Frequency
24,394
6,002

Western Germany
Eastern Germany
Missing
Total

o
30,396

Percent
80.3
19.7
0.0
100.0

Valid Percent
80.3
19.7

100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS
In welchem Bundesland sind die wahlberechtigt? (In which state are you eligible to vote?)

01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Schleswig-Holstein
Hamburg
Niedersachsen
Bremen
Nordrhein-Westfalen
Hessen
Rheinland-Pfalz
Baden-Wiirretmberg
Bayern
Saarland
Berlin-West
Berlin-East
Brandenburg
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
Sachsen
Sachs en-Anhalt
Thiiringen

Recoded options:
00. West (01-11: Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Bremen, NordrheinWestfalen, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden- Wiirretmberg, Bayern, Saarland, and BerlinWest)
01. East (12-17: Berlin-East, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, SachsenAnhalt, and Thiiringen)
Satisfaction with Democracy

Satisfied
Dissatisfied
Missing
Total

Frequency
4,456
4,247
21,693
30,396

Percent
14.7
14.0
71.4
100.0

Valid Percent
51.2
48.8

100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

Was willden Sie allgemein zur Demokratie in Deutschland sagen? Sind sie ... (What would you
say about demo racy in Germany? Are you .. .)
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-----------------------------------------------------

01.
02.
9.
0:

eher zufrieden
eherunzufrieden
keine Ahnung
missing! nicht erhoben

Recoded Options:
00. more satisfied (01: eher zuJrieden)
01. more dissatisfied (02: eher unzuJrieden)
99. don't know/missing

Perceived personal economic situation

Poor
Sometimes good! sometimes bad
Good
Missing
Total

Frequency
3,811
12,273
14,247
65
30,396

Percent
12.5
40.4
46.9
0.2
100.0

Valid Percent
12.6
40.5
47.0
100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS
Wie beurteilen Sie heute Ihre eigene wirtschaftliche Lage? (How would you describe your
current economic situation?)
1.
2.
3.
9.

gut
teils gutl teils schlecht
schlecht
keine Ahnung

Recoded options:
01. poor (03: schlecht)
02. sometimes good! sometimes poor (02: teils gutl teils schlecht)
03. good (01: gut)
99. don't know (9)

Perceived Level oj Conflict Between Immigrants and Germans

No conflict
Not so strong
Strong
Very strong
Total
Missing

Frequency
42
485
516
165
1,208
29,188

Percent
0.1
1.6
1.7
0.5
4.0
96.0

Valid Percent
3.4
40.1
42.7
13.7
100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

In allen Gesellschaften gibt es Gegensatze oder sogar Konflikte zwischen verschiedenen
gesellschaftlichen Gruppen. Wie stark sind Ihrer Meinung nach die Konflikte hier in
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Deutschland? Sind die Konflikte zwischen Auslander und Deutschen ... (In all societies there
are conflicts between d(fferent social groups. How do you evaluate the conflicts here in
Germany? Are the conflicts between immigrants and Germans ... )
1.
2.
3.
4.
9.
O.

sehr stark
stark
nicht so stark
gibt es da keine Konflikte
keine Ahnung
nicht erhoben

Recoded options:
1. not so strong (3: nicht so stark)
2. strong (2: stark)
3. very strong (1: sehr stark)
99. there is not conflict! don't know! not asked (4: gibt es da keine Konjlikte. 9, 0)
Age

18-29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50-59 years
60-69 years
70 years and older
Missing
Total

Frequency
4,732
5,430
6,043
4,457
6,048
3,686

o

30,396

Percent
15.6
17.9
19.9
14.7
19.9
12.1
0.0
100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS

Wie alt sind Sie?
1. 18 bis 20 Jahre
2. 21 bis 24 Jahre
3. 25 bis 29 Jahre
4. 30 bis 34 Jahre
5. 35 bis 39 Jahre
6. 40 bis 44 Jahre
7. 45 bis 49 Jahre
8. 50 bis 59 Jahre
9. 60 bis 69 Jahre
10. 70 Jahre und alter
Recoded options:
1. 18-29 years (01-03: 18 bis 20 Jahre, 21 bis 24 Jahre, 25 bis 29 Jahre)
2. 30-39 years (04-06: 30 bis 34 Jahre, 35 bis 39 Jahre)
3. 40-49 years (01-03: 40 bis 44 Jahre, 45 bis 49 Jahre)
4. 50-59 years (01-03: 50 bis 59 Jahre)
5. 60-69 years (01-03: 60 bis 69 Jahre)
6. 70 and older (01-03: 70 Jahre und alter)
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Valid Percent
15.6
17.9
19.9
14.7
19.9
12.1
0.0
100.0

Education
Frequency
108
8,883
10,227
9,234
456
1,396
90
30,396

Still in school, no degree
8th grade
High school
University prep
Professional degree
University-level
Missing
Total

Percent
0.4
29.2
33.6
30.4
1.5
4.6
0.3
100.0

Valid Percent
0.4
29.3
33.7
30.5
1.5
4.6
100.0

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS
Welchen Schulabschluss haben Sie selbst?
1. Hauptschluabschluss
2. Mittlere Reife
3. Abitur
4. Abgeschlossenes Fachschulstudium
5. Abgeschlossenes Universitats-, Hochschul- bzw. Fachhochschulstudium
6. Keine Hauptschulabschluss
7. Noch in der Schule
8. Keine Ahnung
Recoded Options:
O. No degree or still in school
1. Secondary school
2. High school degree
3. Higher education (university prep)
4. Professional degree
5. University-level
Employment

Not iri work force
Employed
Unemployed
Missing
Total

Frequency
12,118
16,443
1,404
431
30,396

Source: POLITBAROMETER 2005, GESIS
Sind Sie zur Zeit berufstatig? (Are you currently employed?)
1. Voll beschaftigt
2. Teilzeit beschiiftig
3. In Kurzarbeit
4. Erziehungsurlaub, Mutterschutz
5. Arbeitslos, un UmschulungsmaBnahme
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Percent
39.9
54.1
4.6
1.4
100.0

Valid Percent
40.4
54.9
4.7
0.0
100.0

6. Arbeitslos, ohne UmschulungsmaBnahme
7. Rente, Pension, Vorruhestand
8. In Ausbildungl (Hoch-)Schule
9. Wehr-/ Zivildienst
10. Nicht berufsHitigi Hausfrau! Hausmann
99. keine Ahnung
00. nicht erhoberi
Recoded Options
O. Out of work force (07-10: Rente, Pension, Vorruhestand, In Ausbildungl (Hoch-)Schule,
Wehr-I Zivildienst, Nicht berufstiitigl Hausfraul Hausmann)
1. Employed (01-04: Voll beschiiftigt, Teilzeit beschiiftig, In Kurzarbeit, Erziehungsurlaub,
Mutterschutz)
2. Unemployed (05-06: Arbeitslos, mit UmschulungsmaJ3nahme, Arbeitslos, ohne ,
UmschulungsmaJ3nahme)
99. Don't know/ not asked (0,9)
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Appendix C
Satisfaction with Democracy
Table 5.2 Satisfaction with Democracy
Estimate (B)
0.75

Standard Error
(0.17)

P value

Economic Situation

-0.57

0.10

0.00

Employment

0.05

0.13

0.69

Age

0.04

0.44

0.419

Education

-0.18

0.07

0.01

Attitude/Immigration

0.48

0.09

0.00

Pseudo R2

0.13
1,589

Region

N

0.00

Note: Data come from the Politbarometer 2005. Table entries are logit estimates. 2-tailed test. P-

value represents the probability that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no effect of
region on dissatisfaction with democracy. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Both region and perceived economic status are significant in predicting support
for satisfaction with democracy; however, they have different correlations. It is shown
by this analysis that region significant influences dissatisfaction with democracy with
citizens in eastern Germany more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. Personal
economic situation is negatively correlated with satisfaction with democracy, meaning
that the more positively one perceives their personal economic situation, the more likely
to be satisfied with democracy. Logically, this· makes sense, as one is not likely to be
dissatisfied with the status quo if they perceive their economic situation positively.
Employment status is, much like with support for right-wing extremism,
insignificant to predicting satisfaction or dissatisfaction with democracy. Similarly, age
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is not significant in predicting satisfaction with democracy. This means that those who
experienced the socialist regime and were indoctrinated with socialist ideology are
neither more likely nor less likely to be satisfied or dissatisfied with democracy.
However, education remains a predictor of satisfaction with democracy, meaning that the
higher the level of education one receives, the less likely they are to be dissatisfied with
democracy.
A perceived level of conflict with immigrants is significant in determining
satisfaction with democracy. Using the results from the previous models, it can be
assumed that in eastern Germany, dissatisfaction with democracy is positively correlated
with a higher perceived level of conflict between immigrants and Germans. We see a
positive correlation indicating that the stronger the perceived conflict between
immigrants and Germans, the more likely one is likely to be dissatisfied with democracy.
While this finding is not enough to support the statement that citizens who perceive a

high level of conflict between immigrants and Germans are more likely to support rightwing extremist parties, it is enough to support the claim that citizens in eastern Germany
are more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy which has been shown to be positively
correlated with an increased perception of higher levels of conflict between Germans and
immigrants and support for right-wing extremist parties.
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Outstanding Political Science Senior Seminar Paper, Indiana University Southeast, 2007
Outstanding Student, German Department, Indiana University Southeast, 2007
Outstanding Student, International Studies Department, Indiana University Southeast, 2007
Deans List Award, Indiana University Southeast, 2003-2007
Overseas Study Scholarship, Indiana University, 2005-2006
Overseas Study Scholarship, Indiana University Southeast, 2005-2006
Lee Hamilton Scholarship, Indiana University Southeast, 2005-2006
Phi Eta Sigma, Indiana University Bloomington, 2002-2003

Research Conferences:
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•

•

•

•

"Sind die Deutschen wirklich ein Volk?: Voter Behavior and Leftist Party Support in a
"united" Germany" Kentucky Political Science Association Meeting, Murray, Kentucky,
March 2010.
"Wir sind ein Volk!: Democracy and exit-voice dynamics in eastern Germany post
unification" National Conference of Undergraduate Research, Salisbury, Maryland, April
2008
"Voter Behavior Prediction Theories and the Front National," Indiana University
Undergraduate Research Conference, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis,
Indianapolis, Indiana, 2006
"German Welfare Reform and its Effects on German Politics," Indiana University
Undergraduate Research Conference, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis,
Indianapolis, Indiana, 2005

Employment:
Graduate Research Assistant, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY (2008-present)
• Assisted Prof. Michael Fowler and Prof. Julie Bunck in the preparation of two book
manuscripts and four journal articles; researched topics ranging from the United Nations to
drug trafficking in Latin America; checked citations and bibliographies.
• Collected data for Prof. Jason Gainous on Internet campaigning and electoral success: tracked
Congressional candidates nationwide in the 2008 election and tabulated their web
pervasiveness using weekly Google Page Ranks; researched candidates and compiled a
database in SPSS to organize factors which influence vote share, such as age, incumbency,
campaign funding, years in political office, district, ethnicity, and district competiveness.
• Utilized academic databases, such as Academic World News and Ethnic News Watch, to
conduct content analyses for Profs. Laurie Rhodebeck and Jason Gainous of American print
media from 1988 until 2008, focusing primarily on gay rights, presidential candidates, major
political parties; and minorities and moral values.
Additional Research Experience:
• Edited and proofread for Cliff Staten. 2008. "From Terrorism to Legitimacy: Political
Opportunity Structures and the Case of Hezbollah." The Online Journal of Peace and
Conflict Resolution 8(1): 32-49.
• Edited, checked citations and created bibliography for Sumihiro Kuyama and Michael R.
Fowler. 2009. Envisioning Reform: Enhancing UN accountability in the twenty-first century.
New York: United Nations University Press.
• Created tables and figures, used DEA and State Department data to analyze specific drug use
(marijuana, cocaine and heroin) in Central America for Julie Bunck and Michael Fowler.
Anticipated publication 2010. Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation: drug trafficking and the law
in Central America. Penn State Press.
• Edited, organized and checked citations, and proof-read for Dewey Clayton. 2010. The
Presidential Campaign ofBarack Obama: A critical analysis ofa racially transcendent
strategy. New York: Routledge.

Teaching Experience:
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY Graduate Assistant, Spring 2009
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Assisted Prof. Laurie Rhodebeck in Spring 2009 in teaching two sections of POLS 201:
Fundamentals of the American Government, concentrating on the Articles of Confederation,
the Constitution, Federalism, Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, and Voter Behavior; organized
and led study sessions to help prepare students for exams; graded approximately 70 student
research papers; maintained grades using Blackboard for roughly 200 students.

Kelly Educational Services, Jeffersonville, IN, Substitute Teacher, 2007-2008
• Taught approximately 100 students 11 th grade English, concentrating on American
Revolutionary Literature, at Corydon Central High School during teacher's maternity leave.
• Created and executed lesson plans on early American Literature while incorporating Indiana
Education Standards.
Indiana University Southeast, New Albany, IN, Supplemental Instructor (Introduction to
International Relations), 2005
• Introduced students to various studying and note-taking methods while reviewing lecture and
reading materials.
• Increased students' interest in International Relations by incorporating news into weekly
supplemental instruction.
Additional Relevant Work Experience:
World Affairs Council, Louisville KY InternlVolunteer (2007- 2008)
• Worked with the Executive Director, Benjamin Jones, and Program Manager, Matt Madden,
to broaden and to revitalize the Global Issues Forum and Global Economic Forum.
• Researched, invited, and accommodated international speakers.
Extracurricular Activities:
• Graduate Student Council, University of Louisville, 2009-2010
• Arts and Sciences Graduate Student Council, University of Louisville, 2009-2010
• Graduate Research Symposium Committee, University of Louisville, 2010
• Model Arab League, Miami University, Hamilton, OH, 2007
• High School Model United Nations, Chair, Indiana University Southeast, 2005, 2007
• Indiana University Southeast Civil Liberties Union, Member, 2004-2005; 2006-2007
• Model United Nations, University of Indianapolis, Indianapolis, 2006
• Model European Union, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, IN, 2005
• Indiana University Southeast International Student Organization, Member, 2004-2006
• Indiana University Southeast International Student Organization, Vice-President, 2004
Foreign Language Qualifications:
• English: fIrst language: fluent reading and listening comprehension, advanced writing
• German: second language: B.A.,German; one year study in country, lifelong family exposure
• French: studied three years, intermediate levels for reading and listening comprehension
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